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

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S. Navy

. . . PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

POPULATION CONTROL

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College.

The material contained in the *Review* is for the professional education of its readers. The frank remarks and personal opinions of the lecturers and authors are presented with the understanding that they will not be quoted without permission. The remarks and opinions shall not be published nor quoted publicly, as a whole or in part, without specific clearance in each instance with the lecturer or author.

Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers.

The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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Cover photograph—Rear Admiral Stephen Bleeker Luce, U.S. Navy who, in the rank of Commodore, was the first President of the Naval War College, 6 October 1884 to 22 June 1886.

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EDITORIAL BOARD

CHALLENGE!

Thomas Carlyle said. "What is all knowledge but recorded experience?"

The past is not dead. It survives in many forms taken for granted — in laws, customs, institutions, and beliefs. Though often intangible, these provide an environment real as the physical world. If the past were dead, a simple post-mortem presented at the "Bar of History" could obtain a final verdict on any disputed point. How simple — and how impossible.

Review the state of naval affairs at the opening of the Civil War. Excerpts from a lecture on Naval Administration by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce best sketch in the situation.

"At the very outset of the Secession movement the relief of Fort Sumter was the cause of much anxious thought. Councils were divided. The several members of the Cabinet were comparative strangers to each other, and the whole country was in a state of ferment."

President Lincoln had been in office for the brief period of one month. The most powerful member of his cabinet, Secretary of State Seward, had definite and devious ideas of his own concerning both foreign and domestic policy. Mr. Seward believed that Fort Sumter should be evacuated and he had assured the Border States and the Confederate Commissioners that this would be done. He called for emphasis on the preservation of the Union and urged that the slavery question should be put in the background. He also believed that Fort Pickens at Pensacola and certain forts on the Gulf of Mexico should be reinforced and could be held.

The President, after giving the subject much careful consideration, finally

decided that it was his duty to make the attempt to succor the beleaguered garrison in Sumter despite the strong representation by the Secretary of State to the contrary.

A small force consisting of *Powhatan*, *Pawnee*, *Pocahontas* and *Harriet Lane*, under the command of Captain Samuel Mercer, a past captain of the old school, was ordered to rendezvous on the 5th day of April 1961, 10 miles due east of Charleston Light in utmost secrecy.

Mr. Seward persisted in his opposition to the relief of Fort Sumter. Without reference to the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy and with the assistance of Captain Meigs of the Army and Lieutenant Porter of the Navy he prepared a classified order for the President's signature diverting *Powhatan* from the Sumter effort to a separate expedition for the reinforcement and defense of Fort Pickens. This same order relieved Captain Mercer and placed Lieutenant Porter in command of *Powhatan* and specified that the Navy Department was, in no circumstances, to be informed of the new action taken. Mr. Lincoln signed the order in the confusion of the moment, and the failure of the Sumter relief was assured.

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles appealed to the President once the action became known to him, but it was too late. The senior officer of the Fort Sumter expeditionary force had been relieved and the heaviest ship diverted. Mr. Lincoln recognized that to abandon the fort, even under the existing circumstances, would be "utterly ruinous" for the necessity for doing so "would not be fully understood." He was determined to send supplies to the garrison and, if the Secessionists forcibly resisted, on them would be the responsibility of initiating hostilities. This was the overriding political consideration. Preparations continued for sending an expedition to Fort Sumter and notice was given to the Governor of South Carolina to this effect. Whereupon the Fort was attacked and fell into Confederate hands. Relief ships appeared off Charleston but were ineffective.

The dire confusion the conflicting orders gave rise to may be better imagined than described. Making every allowance for a state bordering on chaos, the method of procedure in this case brings out in the strongest light the utter lack of coordination existing in Mr. Lincoln's new Government at a time of great national crisis. The individuals of the President's Cabinet involved in this case eventually proved to be able and effective members of the team which prosecuted the long war to a successful conclusion, but we can see that they had much to learn at this point.

We can profit from their experience without repeating it. In peace as in war it is essential that coordinated policies involving the conduct of political, economic, psychological, and, as necessary, military operations must combine to meet the challenge we face in reaching our national objectives. There is little margin for error at the pace we must set today in discharging our worldwide responsibilities.

Mr. Lincoln and his Government preserved democracy and the Federal Union in the great national crisis of more than a hundred years ago. As the most powerful nation in the world today, the United States must preserve freedom and provide leadership in the quest for global peace and security.

John T. Hayward

CURRENT CONCEPTS AND PHILOSOPHY OF WARFARE

Professor Raymond G. O'Connor

Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History
Naval War College

A lecture delivered to the Naval War College on 12 September 1967

This morning I'm supposed to talk about current concepts and philosophy of warfare, and I want to begin by observing that it's more appropriate for me to be talking on today's topic than it was to be speaking on that of yesterday. To illustrate, we'll reveal the process of what some people refer to as progress. At the time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf it was presumptuous for some of the junior officers to find fault with Admiral Halsey's conduct. Professionalism still enjoyed some degree of status in those days, and the acknowledged experts on warfare were those in uniform. Still, the old admonition about war being too important to be left with the generals was taken somewhat to heart, and the politicians became involved, as you are aware, in military activity. After 1945 the original adage then was amended to read:

"War is too important to be left to generals and politicians." So, evidencing considerable desperation, the problem of war was turned over to the professors, where largely it rests today. I should add that the armchair strategist, the grandstand and Monday morning quarterback, has always been with us, but he was not considered respectable, enjoyed little prestige, exercised little influence over actual policy, and usually did not enjoy the sanctuary of the academic profession.

Today's defense intellectuals, as they are sometimes called, have advanced degrees, a professional academic background or affiliation, and usually function with some kind of defense institute supported largely by foundation or government funds. Among these institutions is the Rand Corporation, the so-called "think tank" at Santa Monica, Calif., which has achieved a good deal of notoriety. Sponsored by the Air Force, it has turned out a great many writings, and it has produced a number of people who are in the Defense Department today. Others such as Herman Kahn, who was a physicist originally, wrote his book *On Thermonuclear War* while he was at Rand Corporation and now heads up the Hudson Institute. A great many other people are affiliated with civilian educational institutions or with particular institutes that devote their time and effort to strategic studies. The writings of these defense intellectuals are not relegated to the obscurity of the conventional learned journals but they are widely promulgated through all of our communications media. Moreover, they are heeded by those in government who have the responsibility for determining our military policy. There are a number of reasons why this phenomenon has occurred, and I want to mention a few because I think it helps us understand the nature and character of current thinking, and, also, I think it helps us understand why most of the literature on the subject has appeared in the United States.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Dr. Raymond G. O'Connor occupies the Ernest J. King Chair of Maritime History at the Naval War College.

The Chair of Maritime History, named for Admiral King, was established at the Naval War College in 1953. Its occupant is appointed for a term of 1 year by the Naval War College President. The incumbent provides professional advice and guidance to the President, Chief of Staff, faculty, and students in maritime history and related subjects; he is a lecturer, seminar participant, and a consultant for student research programs; he teaches courses in maritime history both in the core curriculum and in the electives program; and he assists in curriculum planning.

Professor O'Connor holds an M.A. from The American University and a Ph.D. from Stanford University, and he attended the University of San Francisco Law School. Retired from the Navy, Professor O'Connor has served in professorial billets in History at Stanford University, the University of Kansas, the University of Costa Rica, and the University of California at Santa Barbara. In 1965 he was appointed professor of History and chairman of the Department of History at Temple University.

As Associate, Historical and Research Organization, Professor O'Connor completed a number of studies for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His books include *Perilous Equilibrium; Readings in the History of American Military Policy* (editor); *Readings in Twentieth Century History* (co-editor); and *American Defense Policy in Perspective* (editor and coauthor). In addition, he has contributed numerous articles to various periodicals. His current project is *A History of American Foreign Policy, 1921-1941*, which will be volume VI in a seven-volume history of American foreign policy edited by Alexander DeConde.

In 1911 Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote a letter to Theodore Roosevelt in which he told of just reading a book by the naval historian Corbett on the Seven Years' War. In this book Mahan discerned two points which he thought were important enough to call to the attention of the former President.

> First: Diplomatic conditions affect military action, and military consideration, diplomatic measures. They are inseparable parts of a whole. And as such, those responsible for military measures should understand the diplomatic factors, and vice versa. No man is fit for Chief of Staff who cannot be entrusted with the knowledge of a diplomatic situation. The Naval man also should understand military conditions and the military the naval.

The second point he made was this:

> For a military establishment the distinction between a state of war and a state of peace is one of words, not of facts.

It may seem strange that Mahan should think these points of sufficient importance to bring them to the attention of one of the best informed men in the world on such matters. But these concepts were so alien to accepted doctrine in the United States that he felt compelled to do so. This situation was largely due to the fact that America, unlike most other nations, had enjoyed free security from other major powers by virtue of the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean moats, the state of armament technology, and the lack of significant military commitments abroad. This condition and this kind of thinking prevailed until after the Second World War when the United States could no longer afford the luxury of military innocence as a result of two developments: First, advances in weaponry and delivery systems which made this continent immediately vulnerable to the most destructive weapons ever devised by man; second, the assumption of responsibility for protection against Communist aggression anywhere in the world. The magnitude and complexity of the problem were so great and the role was so foreign to the American experience that the military professionals seemed incapable of devising a proper strategy. It may also be that they knew too much about it, and "fools rush in," etc.

Samuel Huntington has explained the civilian interest in military strategy on the grounds that:

> Military officers, by definition, have to be members of one of the armed services. Inevitably they tend to analyze strategic problems through service prisms. Early in military history this was perfectly feasible. Mahan produced a strategy of seapower and Douhet one of airpower. The cold war, however, requires strategies of massive retaliation, limited war, and graduated deterrence. The strategic categories cut across service lines. Service doctrine couched in terms of land, sea, and air were more of a hindrance than a help in the analysis of many important strategic problems.

Admiral Wylie in his recent book, *Military Strategy*, contends that strategic theory is properly the province of the scholar and the social scientist. Strategy itself may not be a science, he notes, but "strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive." I hesitate to claim that these qualities are the exclusive province of those in the academic field, but at least Admiral Wylie seems to believe they are.

According to Bernard Brodie, "Today we can say without hesitation and with animus that the military problem is, even in its stark outlines, not only beyond the competence of any one person or group of persons, but beyond the competence of any one profession." Who else, we may ask, but the academic person would undertake such an im-

possihle task? Charlie Brown once said that no problem was so great that he could not run away from it, but, of course, he was uncorrupted by higher education. Perhaps I too, in spite of my alleged erudition, have been escaping the problem, and it's time to deal with terms.

Strategy is one of the most loosely used words in our language, but we can't dismiss it on the grounds of imprecision. The term comes from the Greek *strategos* which means a military commander. But I don't intend today to run you through the gamut of etymology and semantics. Personally, I like to define strategy in three categories: First, strategy which employs the nation's resources to protect and promote its interests without war. This definition does include the use of force, although without violence since war is not present. A second category is strategy which employs the nation's resources in war toward the attainment of national goals. And third, strategy which concerns the movement and support of military forces in war prior to contact with the enemy.

As you are aware, the latter category is the one which was most popular and most often used. That is, it was used in this particular sense by military personnel until the Second World War and after. Most contemporary theorists would not accept the third category because it ignores the political objective. Also, for example, Admiral Eccles would call my first category *national strategy* and my second category *military strategy*. Liddell Hart is among those who would reject my third category on the grounds that it ignores the political end. So, essentially, the modern theorists are concerned with what Brodie calls "the intellectual no-man's-land in the sphere where military and political problems meet."

In regard to the term "concept" which is in the title of this lecture, I'm going to take the coward's way out and define it as a mental image or idea of how a thing should be done or established. So the mental image or idea is the key here. And as for the term "philosophy," it originally derived from the Greek meaning "love of wisdom." Bertrand Russell has defined philosophy as "talking about things we don't know." For our purposes I'm going to say that it deals with speculation. That is, an attempt to analyze and speculate about what we are not, epistemologically, in a position to be sure of. For example, it is impossible to analyze a nuclear war because none has ever been fought. Now at this point you may feel like the boy in the James Thurber cartoon who faced with an unappetizing dish at meal-time, said, "I say it's spinach, and I say to hell with it." So perhaps a modest chronological approach may be more intelligible.

Following the Second World War, and for a variety of reasons, the United States military policy was based on, actually, "massive retaliation" designed to deter the major antagonist. A large share of military expenditures went into aircraft, and our possession of the atomic bomb seemed, to the powers that were in Washington, adequate. In 1949 two things happened. Russia detonated a nuclear bomb and a hassle erupted in the United States over what was known as the B-36 controversy. Careers were made and destroyed in the armed services during this particular debate. In 1950 a task force under Paul Nitze produced what came to be known as National Security Council Study No. 68 — not because it was produced by the Council, but because it was referred there, for deliberation and recommendation, by the President. Reaching the Council in the spring of 1950, this study urged a more balanced military structure, but the Korean war broke out before any recommendation

came from the National Security Council. The Eisenhower Administration took office in 1953 with the slogans "more bang for the buck," "liberation, not containment," and "massive retaliation." Our military policy returned to that of deterrence by the threat of nuclear annihilation of the instigator, not necessarily the perpetrator, of aggression. During the 1950's numerous studies emerged - not all from the academic community - dealing with the subject of limited war, proclaiming the need for more conventional forces, criticizing massive retaliation, and denouncing reliance on the Strategic Air Command.

The Kennedy Administration entered office committed to a military program that would embrace, as the title of the McNamara reading in your assignment indicates, the entire spectrum of defense. The nation, it was contended, must be prepared to handle wars in any dimension of magnitude, so the choice, if we were faced with a situation, would not be that of on the one hand retreat or on the other hand nuclear annihilation.

The first Kennedy budget asked for additional billions to go into the build-up of Army ground forces and intercontinental missiles. The Administration was committed to the graduated response whereby the nation would be prepared to handle any dimension of military aggression with the means appropriate for the job. The means was to be tailored, not only to the character of the opposition, but to the significance of the issue at stake. And you recall those fascinating conversations that we've heard about people sitting in the State Department or in the Department of Defense or in the White House discussing how many lives was it worth to achieve some particular political goal.

Throughout the entire post-World War II period, a practice was followed consistently that had only been used sporadically in previous periods: namely, the overt employment of military force without violence to enforce policy. Embodying many aspects of formal deterrence, it was more comprehensive and promised positive, not merely negative, results. In other words, it was not just a reaction to a challenge, it was used in a way that would demonstrate a certain amount of initiative, and it was designed to change an existing situation. The Kennedy Administration not only implemented many of the ideas of the defense intellectuals, but it brought some of them from their plastic towers into the real world of Government. In some cases interservice rivalry was subordinated to protection against both the methodology and the conclusions of the long-haired, egghead professors. Systems analysis and cost effectiveness reverberated through the corridors of the Pentagon, and one disgruntled officer grumbled that IBM stood for, "I, Bob McNamara."

The concepts that govern our present defense policy are dealt with in the readings for this assignment, so there's no point in my trying to summarize them here. I do want to mention something about certain first strike, second strike theories and, presumably, practices. For many years the United States did endorse the policy of second strike, namely, that we would not be the first nation to launch a nuclear attack. Officially, some believe this is still our policy. Yet we have evidence that on at least two occasions President Kennedy did state that we would launch a first strike if conditions were such that he believed an attack by the Soviet Union was imminent. According to Hugh Sidey in his book, *John F. Kennedy: President*, the President assured De Gaulle when he met with him in

Paris that the United States would not wait for a launching of a first strike by the Soviet Union. If, he said, we were really convinced that the Soviet Union intended to make a conventional attack on Europe, we would launch a nuclear strike. Apparently De Gaulle was not convinced, and Kennedy obviously was trying to hold NATO together at that time.

At this point we are dealing with what some authorities call "preventive war and preemptive war." And there is a distinction between the two. The first contends that a nation should strike if it believes that in the foreseeable future it may be attacked or it may run into a situation where a war will develop. The second pertains to a situation where you believe that an attack is imminent and you strike before the other fellow does. There is some argument at the present time as to whether the Israeli action this summer against the Arab countries was a preemptive or a preventive strike. This depends a lot, I guess, on one's sympathies. It depends in part, too, on how you interpret the information we get as to what went on in the Israeli Cabinet. In any event, those are two important distinctions that are made by many of the theorists, and they're hotly debated in the higher echelons, not only of defense institutions, but also in the Government.

Now I'd like to devote the remainder of the time to a brief account of some of the work that is being done in the field of warfare. And I should point out that it has been reliably concluded that over 100,000 pieces of literature, articles, reports, and books have been written on the subject in recent years. And this does not account for classified studies. Also, as I mentioned before, most of this work has been done in the United States. One of the more notable exceptions is the Institute for Strategic Studies in London headed by Alistair Buchan. Another is the Institut Français d' Études Stratégiques with its provocative director, General André Beaufre. The literature on thermonuclear and nuclear war — what some refer to as general war or total war — has been considerable, but it has not been conclusive, and it has not been unanimous in its findings or conclusions. When the United States had a monopoly in bombs and delivery systems, there was moralizing about their use and criticism of a reliance on them to deter aggression. When the Soviet Union began to catch up, it was popular to believe that the war would be over in 3 days and the destruction would result in an automatic cessation. You didn't have to worry about what some people call today "conflict termination" because the very nature of the war itself would ensure its end. During this period President Eisenhower warned that "there is no alternative to peace," and Walter Millis described the situation as the hypertrophy of war. Many thought that since, demonstrably, war was no longer socially useful by any stretch of the imagination, it would not recur.

In the midst of alarm over what was popularly referred to as "the balance of terror," Oskar Morgenstern, an expert in the mathematics of game theory, saw hope for peace in the establishment of what he called "invulnerable retaliatory forces" by both camps, so each side would be secure in the knowledge that a surprise attack would not be decisive. An essential element in creating this security, he felt, was the immediate implementation of a vast and necessarily expensive civil defense program to insure that the population would survive a thermonuclear attack. The retaliatory forces themselves would consist primarily of guided missiles against which no de-

fense did exist, and he thought that the least vulnerable of launching platforms was the nuclear-powered submarine. Neither side, then, would be likely to risk attack with the knowledge that sure, instant, and devastating retaliation would follow. He went on to say that with the creation of a thermonuclear stalemate the prospect of limited war would emerge. Here the nature and extent of the conflict, he concluded, must be determined by the aims or objectives which should be defined and declared at the outset. In this way the chances of hostilities expanding or escalating would be minimized. Morgenstern cautioned that "mathematical rigor in these areas is not to be expected." But history, he said, furnished examples where armed conflict had been confined to the achievement of limited ends.

In some respects Morgenstern was going along with those who felt that massive retaliation had been emasculated as an instrument of policy by the Soviet Union's growing power massively to retaliate on the United States. It was then argued that if it were discovered that a nuclear attack had been launched against this country, there would be no point in retaliating since no political end could be served, and we might as well save as many lives as possible. This contention was not well received because it would destroy the efficacy of deterrence which most authorities agreed depended on credibility. As Raymond Aron has noted, "One cannot maintain that the thermonuclear holocaust is too horrible for anyone to launch it and at the same time count on the effectiveness of this threat in most circumstances."

Thomas Schelling, another exponent of games theory, deals with decision-making conditions of uncertainty, where the decisions of one side depend on the decisions of the other. Since game theory is a subject with which I am not too familiar, I want to quote what I think is one of the briefest, most concise, and clearest accounts or definitions of game theory and its significance.

> The matrices of game theory render at least three services to the political scientist. They oblige him to accept the kind of discipline of thought, to analyze and enumerate all possible eventualities in a given situation. They help him to construct ideal types of circumstances of conflict, for example, games with two players, *n* number of players, zero sum games and none zero sum games. They permit the abstract formulation of the dialectic of antagonism. Decisions are not taken with regard to a future about which we know nothing, nor with regard to a future in which each event is unknown to us, but in which the approximate frequency of the various classes of events is known to us. The strategic decisions constitute a chain, each decision provokes the following and the latter tends to counteract the preceding one. The chess player moves a pawn in response to the movement of an adverse pawn. The strategist opposes his enemy in a similar fashion.

At this point you should be fully acquainted with the role of game theory in military strategy and in political science.

I do want to emphasize that a great many of the people working in the field of political science, political analysis, studies of war, use game theory. They use game theory, too, in conjunction with the so-called quantification process. This methodolgy has become very popular in the social sciences, and one of the foremost groups is located at Stanford University where, for a number of years, the analysis of the causes or the reasons for the outbreak of war has been going on. Analyzed on a quantitative basis, that is, and what they're trying to do and what they seem to come up with are

some conclusions regarding the tensions that actually create a state of where so often, especially in the case of World War I, let us say, none of the nations really wanted a war, but the tensions arose for a variety of reasons to such a point that war did occur. And these people, Robert North and Ole Holsti, Richard Brodie, and others — I sometimes refer to them as misplaced historians — quote with approval from a book by Paul Horst entitled *Matrix Algebra for Social Scientists*, in which he says the only way to judge what will happen in the future is by what has happened in the past. "Other things being equal," he declares, "the more frequently things have happened in the past, the more sure you will be they will happen in the future." Continuing this theme he notes that "prediction depends always upon knowledge, and knowledge is necessarily an offspring of the past. This principle is basic not only to science but to all knowledge, and herein lies the crucial importance of history, in one form or another, to all the social sciences." Now these are political scientists who are speaking, they are quantifiers, they are not humanists, as some historians think they are, and they are respected among political scientists even though they do attach a good deal of importance to history.

Well, I want to return to Schelling's ideas, where, as I said, he's dealing with decisions made under conditions of uncertainty, where the decisions on one side depend on the decisions of the other. And I refer you again to that quote on the significance of game theory and the way it works.

Deterrence, Schelling says, is an active principle of life, and he sees it everywhere — in our daily life, children's activities, and the like. The trick, he says, is to get one's way without actually resorting to violence. What he calls arms control is, in his words, "really an effort to take a long overdue step toward recognizing the role of military force in the modern world. Arms control," he goes on to say, "is a recognition that nearly all serious diplomacy involves sanctions, coercion, and assurances involving some kind of power or force and that a main function of military forces is to influence the behavior of other countries, not simply to spend itself on their destruction." He is interested in arms control as well as disarmament. Sometimes these terms are used interchangeably, but it's the controlling of violence and it's the controlling of the means whereby violence is developed and carried out that he stresses. And he sees this in terms of establishing what disarmament tried to do in the 1920's and 1930's. What was then called disarmament was the limitation of armaments, and the essential point was to establish an equilibrium of military power whereby no nation would be capable of launching aggression on another nation with a clear prospect of success.

At the height of the controversy over "the ultimate weapon," Herman Kahn's book *On Thermonuclear War* appeared, to be greeted either with enthusiasm or disgust. One reviewer referred to the author as "Genghis Kahn," because of what the reviewer regarded as Kahn's coldblooded approach to megadeaths — millions of deaths — and the like. Kahn, frightening everyone with statistical accounts of these megadeaths and the genetic effects of radiation, argued that "despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of the survivors and their descendants." Asking the question, "Will the living envy the dead?"

he concluded, no, the living would not envy the dead because actually the conditions under which they lived would be tolerable and presumably better than death. Also, Kahn assured his readers that, "War is likely to continue a few days after the first strike and then terminate probably by negotiation." This was sort of, again as I said earlier, an assumption that the war would not continue after the bombs had been delivered and exploded. Following this book Kahn wrote on thinking about the unthinkable, and then he wrote a careful and detailed study of the process of escalation.

Meanwhile, Soviet military thinking was based on the proposition that the war would actually be won *after* the nuclear strike and that it would be won by conventional forces. This made sense in a European environment where we could not possibly provide adequate troops for a followup. And, of course, Soviet troops would not need to invade the United States in order to secure their objective which, at that time, appeared to be the control of Europe. Which brings us to the question of whether a war could be waged using only conventional and tactical nuclear weapons. Henry Kissinger in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* published in 1957 - - and this book achieved a good deal of notoriety — thought that it could. He believed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not invariably or inevitably lead to escalation to all-out nuclear war. Yet in a later book called *Necessity for Choice*, Kissinger changed his mind. Soviet military writers also have taken different positions on the question, although a recent article in *Pravda* reported in our press last week indicated that the Russians believe that the use of tactical nukes will inevitably lead to an all-out nuclear war, a feeling that evidently prevails at the decision-making level in our Government. Yet Bernard Brodie in his recent book, *Escalation and the Nuclear Option*, deplores what he calls the "downgrading" of tactical nukes and the reluctance to use them. He suggests that if they had been employed early in the Vietnam war we would no longer have our problems there.

One of the more prolific schools of strategy is the Foreign Policy Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, headed by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé. Through its journal *Orbis* and a host of books, this school has expounded the doctrine of "protracted conflict," a term admittedly borrowed from the Communists. Their contention -- and what follows is largely in their own words - - begins with the premise that "we can but surmise that destiny has placed us in the midst of a revolutionary epoch, comparable on a global scale to those which embraced the passing of the city-state, the fall of Rome, and the breakdown of European feudalism." They go on to say that since 1945 the West was willing to give a round and take a round. If the West won a round, as for example in Korea or Jordan, it was in the defense of the status quo. When the Communists won a round, as for example in Czechoslovakia, China, Indochina, and the Middle East, they gained access to ground previously closed to them. In most of Asia and in some measure in most underdeveloped lands, the forces of history, as they put it, are not on the side of the West, they actually favor the Communists. In the face of these hostile tides, the West can only hope to defeat the Communists by learning to counter the strategy of protracted conflict — to manage, they say, to manage conflict in space and time. According to the Communist doctrine of protracted conflict, war, politics, diplomacy, law, psychology, science, and

economics all form a continuum and all are closely integrated in the conduct of foreign policy. The Western people derive strength from the free interplay of various points of view. By contrast, the Communist bloc can be likened to an organism seeking to respond to individual situations on behalf of the entire organism, rather than of its individual parts incapable of speaking with a single voice. They go on to say that the logic of the emerging world conveys an inescapable conflict between communism and the free world — a conflict which inheres in the basic principles on which each system is founded. The struggle was and remains inescapable. Conceivably, the resolution of the struggle in total war may be inescapable.

The duel between the United States and the Soviet Union, then, resolves itself, in the long run, into a contest between two social systems. The implication is that should the United States win the contest in the nonviolent stage in regard to economic competition, ideological competition, political competition, social competition, and what have you, that if the United States should win in all these dimensions, then the Communists will resort to war in order to prevent a final American victory. Therefore, some people conclude, if you follow this particular strategy or theory you might just as well go to war now and get it over with rather than going through the long, tortuous process of defeating the Communists in the nonviolent dimensions of competitions, only to find that you have to defeat them finally with violence. So there are individuals who disagree with the theory of protracted conflict, in part, on those particular grounds.

Now to deal briefly with this question of limited war. Not a great deal of study was done in this country about limited war, surprisingly enough, until the middle 1950's. One would think that the situation that arose in Korea and the dispute between the President and the general would have provoked more theory earlier on the topic of limited war. Actually it wasn't until the middle 1950's that much literature began to appear. Robert Osgood's book *Limited War* was not published until 1957. At present, an enormous amount of literature on this subject exists.

Until 1959 the official Pentagon definition of general war and limited war was as follows: "General war is a conflict in which the forces of the United States and the U.S.S.R. are directly involved and in which atomic weapons are assumed to be used from the outset. Limited war is a conflict short of general war in which United States forces will use atomic weapons as required to achieve national objectives." So atomic weapons, tactical atomic weapons, should fit into, and did fit into, the definition of limited war as accepted by the Department of Defense up to that time.

In a recent book entitled *The Meaning of Limited War*, Ambassador McClintock defines the term as follows:

> Limited war is a conflict short of general war to achieve specific political objectives, using limited forces and limited force. As between the great nuclear powers, the maintenance of the global strategic nuclear balance of power would preclude the use of strategic nuclear weapons, and fear of escalation would inhibit the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

So he rules out any type of nuclear weapons in the framework of limited war. Submitting this definition to the Department of Defense, he was advised that current nomenclature separated guerrilla warfare and unconventional warfare from limited war.

Robert Osgood contends that a limited war is one in which "the dimen-

sions of military force should be proportionate to the value of the objectives at stake." And another authority defined a limited war as "one for a specific objective which by its very existence will establish a certain commensurability between the force employed and the goal to be attained." These last two quotations are from the writings of civilian theorists, and, unlike the previous definitions, you will notice that it's not necessarily the amount of force that determines a limited war, although this is significant. More important is the correlation of that force with the objective. The dimension of military force should be proportionate to the value of the goal at stake.

At this point we enter the realm of value determination. It may be simple enough for us to decide whether a particular product warrants a diversion of funds from our personal budget. If the item is "worth" the allocation we'll make the purchase: if not, we won't. So this is what these people are arguing. How important is this particular piece of land? How important is this particular objective? How many lives are we willing to sacrifice? How much money are we willing to spend? How much of a commitment are we willing to make? So you try to correlate your means with your ends. And this is one of the essential points in limited war according to many of the civilian theorists. Now, how does a government calculate the worth of an objective in lives, money, and effort? Also, there's a question as to whether one should announce in advance how much of an investment will be made, because revealing one's intentions in this regard could be fatal. Finally, and what in my opinion is the most significant criticism of this particular definition and approach, the amount of force necessary to achieve a political goal is determined by the antagonist, who might well believe that the stakes warrant an unlimited effort on his part. The extent and nature of the force required is seldom clear at the outset, and internal or limited wars are rarely stable. The cost of the conflict and the dangers inherent in its continuing may expand out of all proportion to the desired end and produce attendant difficulties in its prosecution. I'm not trying to read anything into current events, but we can go back to the American Revolution and look at it from the point of another country, also from the point of a few men who started shooting at British troops as they were retreating, or we can go on to Mexico, where President Polk had a very nice clear-cut idea of the strategy of the war, how he wanted to wage it, and how much it would cost. But the Mexican Government wouldn't cooperate. They wanted to fight more than Polk thought that they should in terms of the issues at stake.

To reiterate, the antagonist, not the objective, is going to determine the cost of the war and the effort required. If the conflict should get out of hand or out of proportion with the desired end, the Government will then be faced with two distasteful alternatives, either of which could have disastrous consequences. The initial aims may be small, but the failure to achieve these aims, especially by a third party whose prestige and power are on the line, can have enormous repercussions. Where the will of a great nation is being tested, the feeling of resistance may be unlimited. I think we see this phenomenon especially in the context of so-called "proxy wars," where instead of the direct confrontation between or among the great powers we do have them confronting each other through what some would call satellites and others would call proxy states. In this

particular connection I might mention something that Mao Tse-tung has emphasized, because it bears directly on this proxy war issue. He said, "It is impossible for a genuine people's revolution to win victory in any country without various forms of help from the international revolutionary forces. And even if victory were won, it could not be consolidated." So here you have much of the theory of proxy war in regard to the Communists, the thinking behind so-called national wars of liberation, and the kind of commitments that the Soviet Union would make in order to support them. So we do have, as I say, a multitude of writing on the question of limited war in regard to means, in regard to ends, in regard to the correlation of the ends and the means, especially when a proxy war situation prevails.

Now to continue with the developments, or let's say the speculation about strategy, I want to refer again to this recent study entitled *Military Strategy* written by Rear Admiral Wylie. Decrying "the fact that strategy . . . is such a disorganized, undisciplined intellectual activity," he exhorts scholars to put this field in order. Strategy, he writes, is "A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end. A purpose, together with a system of measures for its accomplishment." As you can see, his definition is actually much broader than those that I've used or that most of the current strategists use, because he is not including one of what many of them think is the necessary element, namely, the use of force. Admiral Wylie goes on to briefly analyze the major conventional theories of strategy: The maritime, as expounded by Mahan; airpower, with Douhet as its prophet; the continental, which he identifies with Clausewitz; and guerrilla doctrine as elucidated by Mao. After surveying these various theories, Admiral Wylie points out their shortcomings and postulates some propositions for a general theory that will apply to all dimensions of human conflict and human effort.

One area of investigation that has not had the attention it deserves concerns the vexing problem of conflict termination. Of particular interest because of the frustrating situation in Vietnam, the question of how wars end is perennial. You recall that I have mentioned some opinion regarding the conclusion of nuclear war, and a lack of unanimity is obvious. Contributing to the confusion that characterizes the study of conflict termination is the high-voltage word "victory." Meaning all things to all men, indiscriminately applied in a historical sense, and often viewed as the ultimate solution, the word "victory" has served to obscure the very purpose of war. Carrying with it an almost exclusively military connotation, its use has tended to gloss over the complexities involved in concluding a war and the factors to be considered when trying to bring hostilities to a successful conclusion. The appeal of "victory" has discouraged effective consideration of the differences or similarities, and there appear to be many, between terminating a general war, a limited war, a guerrilla war, a war of national liberation, or an insurrection. A landmark in this field is a book called *Strategic Surrender* written by Paul Kecskemeti of the Rand Corporation. Analyzing four major surrenders (or victories) that took place during World War II, the author reaches some provocative but not universally accepted conclusions. News of this work created a stir in Congress, where it was felt that Government funds should not support studies dealing with topics anathema to the American people.

Before concluding this superficial

and incomplete account of current strategic thinking, it might be well to mention something about fundamentals, namely, whether man is inherently, instinctively addicted to war. This has become a very popular topic of discussion among the sophisticated. Robert Ardrey in his book *African Genesis* claims that man's ancestor — a sort of half animal, half man — did kill with a weapon. Since this ancestor used weapons, then the use of weapons is one of man's instincts, built into his genes. In a later book, *The Territorial Imperative*, Ardrey contends that a desire for land is basic and leads to conflict. Konrad Lorenz' *On Aggression* concludes from a study of animal behavior that aggression is inherent in man. Yet an article in Sunday's *New York Times Magazine* takes issue with these authors and argues that, as the title contends, "War is not in our genes." So the dispute over heredity versus environment goes on. But the question is basic to a study of conflict among humans, and it seems unlikely that a comprehensive general theory of strategy can be formulated unless it includes this aspect of man's nature.

And, finally, we might look briefly to a type of game theory different from that employed by most of the strategic thinkers. Labeling certain techniques "gamesmanship" and "one-upmanship," Stephen Potter wrote on the theme of winning without actually cheating. For example, when playing golf against an opponent of equal ability you want to win, but you don't want to do anything that would be unsporting. So instead of irritating him by spending a lot of time looking for *your* lost ball, you spend a lot of time looking for *his* lost ball. So, gamesmanship or one-upmanship has something to it, certain people believe.

Eric Berne's book, *Games People Play*, has been on the best seller list for two years. In it he contends that people tend to live their lives by consistently playing out certain games in their interpersonal relationships. They play these games for a variety of reasons: to avoid confronting reality, to conceal ulterior motives, to rationalize their activities, or to avoid actual participation. In what he calls "a thesaurus of games," he has listed a number that people play. Among them are such intriguing, albeit vicious, pastimes such as "Why Does This Always Happen To Me?" and "Now I've Got You, You Son of a Bitch."

It is very difficult to end this deadly topic on a humorous note, especially when the sign of our functionally oriented times is epitomized in the advertisement, "For home use, combination air raid shelter and mausoleum." But we should bear in mind the admonition of George Washington many years ago: "If we desire to secure peace . . . it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." The primary purpose of a government is to provide for the safety and security of the people. What it takes to perform this task and why we want to do what we think we must do are the questions which the strategists are trying to answer.

Ψ

SET AND DRIFT



Public Affairs Study. "Extremely worthwhile" is how Rear Adm. H. L. Miller, Navy Chief of Information, described the public affairs study conducted at the Naval War College on 6 and 7 November 1967. ". . . the exposure of give and take on all aspects of public affairs, as it affects the commander at sea and ashore," he said, makes the 1967 discussions ". . . the most productive ever held."

In recognition of the importance of public affairs to military officers, participants included the students from all three schools — Naval Command and Staff, Naval Warfare, and the Naval Command Course. Thirty-one military and civilian public affairs specialists were brought in to assist them. Included among these were Admiral Miller; Mr. Richard Fryklund, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Mr. Stanley Swinton, Associated Press; Mr. Frank Blair, from the NBC "Today" show; Mr. Robert Goralski, NBC newscaster; Mr. John B. Rettaliata, Vice President of Grumman Aircraft Co., representing industry; Mr. Jack Tierney, President of Newsome and Co., representing public relations firms; and Comdr. Glenn Ford, USNR, representing the motion picture industry.

Mr. Fryklund opened the discussions with an address on "Public Affairs Within the Department of Defense." He described the major public affairs policies, programs, and objectives of the Department of Defense as they relate to a military commander's public relations decisionmaking process. Admiral Miller addressed the students on "Public Affairs and Command." He discussed the responsibilities of the military commander in the area of public affairs.

The students were formed into committees to conduct seminars on public affairs problems, practices, techniques, and procedures. Naval Command and Staff students analyzed the catapult explosion on U.S.S. *Leyte* in 1953. Students from the School of Naval Warfare examined the "Palomares" incident. Military public affairs specialists acted as moderators and consultants at the seminars. At a second session, each committee functioned as a Command Information Bureau (CIB) established by a Fleet Commander to plan a 3-day tour by the Secretary of the Navy with 12 distinguished civilian guests. The Secretary's tour included a 1-day visit of naval facilities ashore and 2 days at sea with a carrier force to observe airborne and seaborne weapons demonstrations.

The 31 officers in the Naval Command Course, senior officers from other free world navies, did not participate in the entire study, but they investigated the role of public affairs in an informal 2-hour meeting with Mr. Blair and Commander Ford. As a result of the keen interest expressed by these officers, consideration is being given to expanding this period to a full day in next year's study.

Highlighting the study were two panel discussions, both moderated by Mr. Blair. The subject of the first was "Obligations and Responsibilities of News Media." Panelists were Commander Ford, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Goralski, Mr. Rettaliata, Mr. Swinton, and Mr. Fryklund. The second, which addressed "The Role of Public Affairs," included Admiral Miller and Capt. Charles Kenyon, USNR, in place of Messrs. Rettaliata and Tierney. Captain Kenyon is Director of Promotion and Marketing at the American Education Publishing Co.

Throughout the study it was apparent that the students recognized the importance of public affairs and the necessity for a working knowledge of its basic principles. The discussions enabled them to identify the concepts and essentials of public affairs as they relate to command responsibility and to recognize that public affairs must be considered at all levels of military planning.

Public Affairs panelists *(l. to r.)* Commander Ford, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Goralski, Mr. Rettaliata, Mr. Swinton, and Mr. Fryklund. Not shown is Moderator Frank Blair.



THE PLACE OF POPULATION CONTROL IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

A thesis prepared by
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Class of 1967

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to determine the propriety of incorporating an active program of birth control into U.S. foreign policy toward friendly, neutral, or uncommitted nations receiving U.S. aid for economic development. Application of such a policy is only under question in regard to those less developed nations whose rate of population growth is an obstacle to their development. The nature of such a program is outside the scope of this paper.

The investigation will begin with a review of what the world population state and trends are and the causes thereof. Next, the impact of the situation will be evaluated specifically in relationship to world food production

prospects and effect on economic development. The meaning of the trends vis-a-vis the aims and interests of the United States will come under consideration. A chapter will be devoted to ascertaining the feasibility of controlling population size and growth through birth control. This will be followed by a determination of the position of the U.S. Government on federal support of family planning and how accurately that position reflects the voters' feelings.

The final chapter will express the conclusions reached and will offer recommendations considered appropriate.

I — TRENDS IN WORLD POPULATION

Summary of Total World Growth. Although demographers, economists, and laymen may be divided on the impact of the present world population trends, there can be little disagreement on what these trends are. World population growth since the advent of the industiral age has assumed such proportion as to incur the term "explosion" rather than "growth" to be used in describing what has taken place. To illustrate rate of growth, as well as to show absolute levels at a given point in time, let us look at world population, past and projected, in terms of the varying time spans required for each increase of one billion people.

1st billion	several hundred thousand years	(1810)
2nd billion	115 years	(1925)
3rd billion	35 years	(1960)
4th billion	20 years	(1980)
5th billion	13 years	(1993)

Projecting the rate illustrated ahead 250 years results in a population figure of 135 billion — or one person for each square meter of land.[1] Attaining this situation is, of course, unlikely, but the projection does serve to emphasize the dramatic increase in man's rate of growth.

The broad reason for the above situation is simple — the birth rate is exceeding the death rate. While some changes in birth rates were also involved, the predominant factor in the great acceleration of population growth, first evident in Europe and European settlement areas about 1800, was the decline in the death rate. This upset in the birth rate/death rate equilibrium has been attributed to three factors. The first was the general increase in living standards resulting from technological advances, increased productivity, and the emergence of relatively powerful and stable central governments permitting longer periods of peace and tranquillity. The United States is an example of those nations which in the 19th and 20th centuries experienced this improvement. The comparison between standard of living, using per capita income as a measure, and survivorship, using life expectancy as a measure. is shown in Table I.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lieutenant Commander David W. Somers, Jr., U.S. Navy, holds a B.S. in Marketing/Economics from the University of Maryland. He has served aboard U.S.S. *Henrico* (APA-45), U.S.S. *Spoonbill* (MSC-202), U.S.S. *Robinson* (DD-562), U.S.S. *Stribling* (DD-867), and as Executive Officer of U.S.S. *T. J. Gary* (DER-326).

A 1967 graduate of the School of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College, Lieutenant Commander Somers is presently assigned to the faculty, Naval War College.

TABLE I

PER CAPITA INCOME AND LIFE EXPECTANCY, UNITED STATES, 1799-1945

Year	Per Capita Income[a]	Life Expectancy
1799	$ 439	36.0
1849	244	40.9
1899	501	49.0
1945	1,439	65.8

[a]Adjusted to cost of living (1929=100)

Source: W.S. and E.S. Woytinsky, *World Population and Production* (Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1953), p. 189, 383.

The second major factor was great progress in environmental sanitation and improved personal hygiene contributing to reduction of parasitic, infectious, and contagious diseases. The third was, of course, the great contribution of modern medicine enhanced by recent progress in chemotherapy and insecticides.[2] The impact of the drop in the death rate prevailed over the onset of fertility declines which saw birth rates diminish in the United States, Northern and Western Europe beginning in the late 18th century and then, in the beginning of the present century, fall in Southern and Eastern Europe.[3]

Comparisons: Developed vs. Less-Developed Countries. Prior to World War II the spectacular decrease in the death rate of economically advanced nations had not been shared fully by most of the population of the world. Since then a variety of factors, including the advent of the United Nations and the specialized agencies with dissemination of chemotherapy and insecticides, has brought about mortality declines more dramatic in less developed areas than those experienced in the industrialized regions.[4]

Two significant distinctions have made the impact of the relatively recent death rate drop an altogether different matter for the less-developed areas than for the United States, Europe, and other technologically advanced lands. First, when the death rate diminished in the (now) developed regions it did so gradually, permitting fertility declines to in part offset it. Not so in the developing nations where the change came rapidly. Second, at the time the death rate decline began in Europe and European settlements, there existed sufficient space and resources to prevent the resulting population growth from becoming a great problem. In addition, the rate of economic expansion in those areas accommodated population growth while simultaneously allowing an improvement in living standards. Conversely, for the underdeveloped countries the death rate decline came relatively abruptly and, for many nations, at a time when an overpopulation problem was already in existence. As for the standard of living, many underdeveloped lands ex-

periencing severe population growth have been strained to hold their own. The pattern of world population growth that has resulted can be seen in Table II.

Of more concern than the pattern of growth to date is its projection ahead which shows the continued trend toward a significant change in proportion of population in the developed and underdeveloped developing nations. By continent, the 20th century world population breakdown is as shown in Table III.

It can be seen that the greatest increase in numbers and percentage is expected to occur in the areas with the lesser economic capability to support it.

Urbanization. Another important characteristic of world population dynamics is urbanization · · the movement from the country to the city. Since the beginnings of civilization the rule has been that for urbanization to advance beyond a rudimentary level certain conditions had to exist. Firstly, an increase in food production, substantial enough to permit the release of sizable and increasing numbers of people to engage in nonagricultural industries, was required. Also, trade in services as well as goods had to expand and diversify, since trade is the means of providing an urban population with sustenance. Finally, a centralization of political power was required to establish standards of weights and measures, dependable currency, etc. All of this had been in the making in 17th- and 18th-century Europe, and during the hundred years beginning at about 1750 the urban population in Europe doubled and tripled.[5] Today the trend continues, and using the community size level of 20,000 as the dividing criterion, Table IV expresses the recent urbanization movements.

TABLE II

CHANGES IN WORLD POPULATION FROM 1800 TO 2000

Millions

Year	1800	1850	1900	1960	2000
Developed Countries[a]	210(22%)	295(24%)	510(31%)	854(29%)	1,266(21%)
Developing Countries[b]	750(78%)	945(76%)	1,140(69%)	2,136(71%)	4,699(79%)
Total (100%)	960	1,240	1,650	2,990	5,965

[a]Europe, Oceania, United States and Canada, and U.S.S.R.

[b]Africa, Asia (excluding U.S.S.R.), and Latin America.

Source: "World Population Estimates, 1750-2000," U.N. Doc. WCP/WP/289, Table 5.

TABLE III

ESTIMATED POPULATION AND POPULATION PROJECTED (IN MILLIONS) OF CONTINENTS AND THE WORLD

Year	World	Africa	North America	Latin America	Asia	Europe (incl. U.S.S.R.)	Oceania
1900	1,550	120	81	63	857	423	6
1925	1,907	147	126	99	1,020	505	10
1950	2,497	199	168	163	1,380	574	13
1975	3,828	303	240	303	2,210	751	21
2000	6,267	517	312	592	3,870	947	29

Source: "The Future Growth of World Population," U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SER.A/28, 1958, Table 5.

As Table IV illustrates, the shift to urban areas is substantially greater in the developing regions. The question arises as to whether this phenomenon is a repeat of what occurred in Europe over a century ago. This is difficult to determine, but it can be safely said that no consistent relationship can be seen with measures of economic change such as gains in agricultural productivity, capital accumulation, and development of manufacturing industry. It would appear, rather, that urbanization has begun in a great many, if not all, developing countries well before any appreciable economic growth has occurred.[6]

Age Distribution. Another facet of population which is sometimes not given sufficient emphasis is its age distribution, i.e., how many persons there are at each age. A "young" population is one that contains a large proportion of young persons and has a low average age. Conversely, an "old" population has a high average age and a large proportion of old people. The manner in which the age distribution of a population is determined contains some surprising aspects. It is not difficult to understand that a birth rate of 25 per 1,000 and a death rate of 15 per 1,000 yields the same growth as does a birth rate of 20 per 1,000 and a death rate of 10 per 1,000. The important difference between the two is the effect on age distribution. It would seem that when the death rate is reduced and people live longer, on the average, an older population results. Paradoxically, this is not the effect. The reduction of the death rate actually serves to lower the average age. The reason that the reduced death rates, which prolong man's life, make the population younger is that typical improvements in health and medicine produce the greatest increases in survivorship among the young rather than the old.[7]

While the effect of mortality rate reduction is surprising, the tendency for persons at all ages to share some of the increased chances of survival has made this effect small, and the fertility rate far outweighs it. Whether a national population is young or old is mainly determined by the number of children women bear. When they bear many, the population is young; when

TABLE IV

THE PROCESS OF URBANIZATION IN THE WORLD FROM 1950 to 1960

Region	Level of Urbanization (percent of total population)		Percent of Increase
	1950	1960	
World Total	21	25	17
Developed Regions	37	41	10
North America	43	46	6
Europe	37	40	8
North-Western	52	54	3
Central	37	40	9
Southern	23	27	16
U.S.S.R.	31	36	17
Oceania	46	53	15
Australia & N. Z.	58	65	12
Developing Regions	14	18	28
Africa	10	13	37
Asia (exc. China)	14	18	26
China	10	15	50
Latin America	25	32	28
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay	47	56	19
Remainder of Latin America	21	28	33

Source: "World Survey of Urban and Rural Population Growth," U.N. Doc. E/CN.9/187, 8 Mar. 1965, Table 3.

they bear few, the population is old.[8] Hence, for areas having identical growth rates (same differential between births and deaths per 1,000) the one with the higher birth rate will have a larger proportion of young people. This is illustrated in Table V.

II — IMPACT OF WORLD POPULATION TRENDS

World Population and the United States. What is taking place in world population has been illustrated with only a hint of its implications. Since population trends are only important in terms of their impact on the world and its people, a hard look must be taken at what the recent unprecedented demographic and ecologic phenomena mean. Technology has compressed our world to the point that while population trends may vary in form and degree within national and area boundaries their impact will not likely be completely contained by these boundaries. Admittedly, the chief concern for the American about population dynamics is its effect on his country, but even the most nationalistic observer must appreciate the interdependency of nations. The direction

TABLE V

AGE COMPOSITION OF SELECTED POPULATIONS (PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION)

Age Groups (years)	Birth Rate Type: Very High	Moderately High	Moderately Low	Very Low
0-14	43.1	38.2	30.9	24.0
15-64	54.0	58.0	61.2	64.8
65 and over	2.9	3.8	7.9	11.2

Source: "Provisional Report on World Population Prospects, as Assessed in 1963," U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/SER.R/17, Appendix B, Table 1.

toward increasing politico-economic ties among governments is irreversible, and when population trends become severely problematical in any area the United States cannot hope to remain completely unaffected. Further, it is obvious that the American public is not purely nationalistic, just like it is not purely altruistic in its concern over world problems, whatever they may be. Post-World War II U.S. foreign aid policies, by their character and endurance, are a clear indication that the voting public is willing to devote a portion of the world's largest gross national product (GNP) to help the rest of the world with its social and economic problems. From fiscal years 1956 through 1965 appropriations for economic assistance totaled nearly $20 billion,[1] not including military assistance or Food for Peace shipments under Public Law 480 which exceeded $5 billion in value for the same period.[2] The trend for both is generally upward, and the annual cost of both to each man, woman, and child has been approximately $15. This willingness to assist is likely to continue and even assume a character of eagerness should the severity of the problems be great enough. Therefore, if world population trends are presently, or are likely to become, a world problem, it follows that they are of concern to the American citizenry and that their solution may properly have a place in U.S. foreign policy.

World Population as a Problem. The point at which numbers of people become a problem varies with the viewpoint; it is largely influenced by the effect of a given population situation on the viewer. Even assuming identical knowledge on population and its trends, two persons will differ widely in what it portends as a problem and wider still on what, if anything, should be done about it. We are not concerned here with the view of the manufacturer of children's clothing who daily gives thanks for the baby boom and fails to understand why everyone does not wish to reside in Manhattan. Nor do we particularly give weight to the opinion of the panicked recluse who envisions millions of Chinese spilling into his front yard momentarily. The objective view of the qualified cosmopolite based

on accurate data and extensive study is what is needed to help see exactly what the present 2.1 percent annual increase really means.

Food Supply. That the individual requires certain minimums of income, leisure time, recreation space, and social development may be subject to controversy, but that certain biological needs must be fulfilled cannot be refuted. To survive, man must have nutrition. Thomas Malthus, over a century ago, feared that the world's population would exceed its food supply. Technological advances with agricultural application appeared to make a mockery of his gloomy forecast as world food production soared along with population growth. Where, then, is the problem? Is it not correct that "science will find a way?" What about placing more land under cultivation, and what about more intensive utilization of land presently in use, thereby increasing total yield? What about the vast feeding potential of unconventional sources? All of the above questions have relevance, and doubtless such avenues will be utilized in varying degrees in feeding future larger populations, but great care must be taken that in analyzing the world's food production capability we ask the right questions, for it is difficult enough to get the right answers when the right questions are asked. When the wrong questions are asked it is next to impossible to get the right answers. For example, the question of how much land can be brought under cultivation may give a falsely encouraging answer. This question is only relevant when we add, "At what cost?" Similarly, it is unrealistic to ask, "What is the *potential* for expanding food output?" The question, "What are the *prospects* for increasing food output?" is the only one that could receive an answer of real value.

Problem of the Less-Developed Regions. Perhaps any question that concerns itself with *world* production of food as a whole is a poor one, for there is a sharp division in food production trends between the two economic regions of the world, and transfer of excesses from developed to less-developed areas is not without limit. Table VI illustrates this division in the production of grain, which accounts for 53 percent of man's supply of food energy when consumed directly and a large part of the remainder through indirect consumption.

To those who see a solution to the "poor" world's feeding problem in the belief that the less-developed regions have yet to undergo a development agriculturally like that experienced by the now developed countries at comparable stages of development, let there be a word of caution. The situations are not nearly parallel for the following reasons:

(1) The area of cropland per capita does not nearly approach what the now advanced countries had, and it is shrinking more rapidly because of the population growth.

(2) The rate of population growth in these areas is far greater than that which existed in the developed countries at a comparable development stage, and the emigration opportunity which served to relieve the pressure of population excesses in the last century is no longer there.[3]

Failure to appreciate the above reasons tends to obscure the magnitude of the problem. That the developing nations are not, in fact, experiencing a repeat of the rich world's success story agriculturally is supported by the findings of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) which reports an actual decline over the last 7 years in per capita food products production for Latin America,

TABLE VI

INDEXES OF GRAIN PRODUCTION, AREA AND YIELD, POPULATION, AND OUTPUT PER PERSON BY ECONOMIC REGIONS OF THE WORLD, 1934-38, 1948-52, AND 1960

Region	Quantity	1934-38	1948-52	1960
Developed	Grain production	100	112	151
	Area in grain	100	96	100
	Yield per acre	100	116	151
	Population	100	106	120
	Output per person	100	106	126
Less-Developed	Grain production	100	106	142
	Area in grain	100	118	132
	Yield per acre	100	90	108
	Population	100	123	146
	Output per person	100	86	97

Source: Lester R. Brown, "World Population and Food Supplies, 1980," *American Society of Agronomy*, February 1965, p. 5.

the Far East, Middle East, and Africa.[4] For most of the countries involved the foreign exchange with which to purchase food imports is scarce, and "at least the major part of the increased food consumption needed in these countries must come from the development of their own production."[5]

Because the opportunity to achieve a situation of more cropland per person is limited simply because the divisor increases as fast as the dividend, it would appear that effort to increase food production per capita in less-developed areas would take the form of attempts at increasing yields per acre. Table VI illustrated that for grain the difference between developed and less developed lay essentially in yield per acre. Further, it would seem that since there exists such a great backlog of agricultural technology accumulated in the developed regions, near immediate gains in yield per acre would be forthcoming in the less-developed lands and thereby reduce or even remove the latter's feeding problem. The answer to this apparent paradox attests to the complexity of the problem. Less-developed economies, almost by definition, are not well prepared to utilize this technology which is theirs for the asking. Their agricultural takeoff is blocked by low literacy levels inhibiting dissemination of knowledge and research results, by low income levels which limit capital available, by absence of market orientation, and frequently by absence of a value orientation compatible with the required progress. In short, the whole process of modernizaiton and economic development is missing, and there is no apparent substitute for it. Figure 1 shows the relationship between literacy levels and yield per acre change performance.

Figure 1 would indicate that sharp

yield increases are difficult to achieve in a low literacy region. Similarly, Figure 2 indicates that the higher per capita income associated with economic development is related to large yield jumps.

Help from the Developed Regions. Until World War II the less-developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were all net exporters of grain. The reverse of this flow, which began in the mid-1940's, only amounted to four million tons per year between 1948 and 1952 but grew steadily to an estimated 25 million tons in 1964.[6] As the population of the less-developed world began to exceed the capacity to feed itself, the sharply increased yields per acre in the technologically advanced world took up the slack, largely through concessionary shipments, to the point that for many nations, such as India, a state of dependence on imported grain exists. Currently, however, there have been indications of limits not only in the *willingness* to provide more food to such insatiable, but pauper, consumers as India, but also of limit in continued *ability* to provide. The attitude in regard to the former is perhaps best revealed by the response, or lack of it, to the efforts of the Johnson Administration to enlist other nations to share the burden of India's food deficit. In April 1966 Secretary of State Rusk informed Congress that 113 nations had been requested to help India with grain, fertilizer, or finances with which to buy grain on the world market. As the year drew to a close only 23 nations had promised some such form of help.[7] Concerning capability limits, President Johnson expressed concern at the signing of the Food for Freedom program in saying, "Even the food-producing capability of U.S. farmers — unmatched in history - - cannot suffice indefinitely in a world that must feed a million new human beings each week."[8] Douhtless he was concerned over the dwindling of the 1.4 billion bushel U.S. wheat stockpile of 1961 to less than one-half that amount a short 5 years later.[9]

Realistic Prospects. There is wide and expert opinion that no serious *technological* obstacles prevent feeding world population as it grows. One study has concluded that it is *theoretically* possible to feed seven to eight billion people by wider application of present technology without resorting to unconventional methods (which are prohibitively expensive in most cases). Unfortunately, the time required to reach this state of agricultural productivity is estimated by this 1957 study to be 75 to 100 years. U.N. population projections depict a world of 8 billion a minimum of 25-50 years before the passage of that time frame. The point, however, is that present food production effort, even on a world-wide basis, falls so far short of near-future requirements. Even to feed 4-5 million people on an adequate diet would require a world agricultural productivity level almost double the 1956 average. To do this, an investment of $500 billion and 30 to 50 years' time were estimated required.[10] In a more recent study, after pointing out that of the present world population up to half already suffer from hunger and that 10 to 15 percent are clearly undernourished, the FAO stated that the total food supplies required by developing countries must be increased fourfold by the end of this century simply to provide a nutritionally adequate but simple diet for all their increased millions of that time.[11]

As for meeting food needs through unconventional sources, the situation is one of promise mixed with obstacles.

Figure 1—Relationship Between Literacy Levels and Yield-raising Capabilities*



Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, NEG. ERS 3288-64(10) as illustrated in Brown, p. 18.

Figure 2—Relationship Between Income Levels and Yield-raising Capabilities *



Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, NEG. ERS 3287-64(10) as reproduced in Brown, p. 21.

For example, fishmeal, the result of processing the whole fish into a protein concentrate, has been produced and sold for animal feed for as little as 5 cents per pound. However, for human consumption the handling of fish and maintenance of sanitary measures and precautions required adds greatly to the cost. The resulting product passes the present price of existing protein foods such as powdered skim milk. Attempts to use algae, green leaves, grass, and bacteria as protein sources for human consumption have met with limited success because of poor palatability. Wholly synthetic diets are prohibitively expensive and impalatable for ordinary use. Only oilseed meals (well-processed cotton, soybean, or other oilseed flour mixed with ground corn, wheat, sorghum, or other cereal) have experienced significant success but, by themselves, are not nearly the full solution to the increasing food need.[12]

Conclusions About Food vs. Population Prospects. An examination has revealed sharp differences between developed and less-developed regions in capacity to feed their respective peoples. While the total food production in post-World War II years has risen for both areas, the developed regions continue to produce beyond their own needs because of application of advanced technology and limited population growth. Meanwhile, the less-developed regions, poorly prepared to implement the technology which could give them greater yield per acre, have witnessed their food requirement in the form of population growth outstrip their producing capacity. The result has been increasing transfer of food to the less-developed regions which, by definition, have limited capacity to cover its cost. Studies indicate that the world theoretically has the capability to feed the doubled population projected for the end of the century, but a degree of coordination and shift of resources heretofore unprecedented is required to do it. With the United States and other surplus food producers already feeling the burden of the hunger of the growing "poor" world more each year, the question between now and A.D. 2000 is *will* the need be met and after A.D. 2000 *can* the need be met? In the words of Binay R. Sen, head of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: "The next 35 years, until the end of the century, will be, as I have said, a most critical period in man's history. Either we take the fullest measures both to raise productivity and to stabilize population growth, or we will face disaster of unprecedented magnitude." [13]

Economic Development. Intimately related to the agricultural productivity of a nation is its general economic development. That the inferiority of the less-developed regions in agricultural yields is paralleled by poor performance in most other sectors of the economy is no coincidence. The key to the productivity so sorely needed is technology. This technology and the ability to exploit it require capital investment, that is, using what is left over after the primary necessities of the population have been attended to for equipment, health, and advanced education. What, then, is the connection between population size and trend and savings available for capital investment? Large population size or high density may have undesirable attributes as a subway trip in New York at rush hour will attest to, but crowding is not necessarily synonymous with poverty. Were this the case, the coastal megalopolis between Boston and Washington, D.C., with its 2,000 persons per mile density, could not enjoy a high

median family income. Neither could the highly populated countries of Western Europe boast the generally high standard of living that exists there. Rather, it is the *rate* of population growth that is the major impediment to higher per capita income and the accompanying higher marginal propensity to save resulting in more capital investment. This must be explained in the light of capital/output ratio which means that for an investment of, for example, three units of capital, an annual addition of one unit would be made to the national income. This would represent a 3 to 1 marginal capital/output ratio which is a reasonable figure for a developing nation.[14] In such a situation a developing economy with great effort, because so much of its production is used up in primary necessities, may be able to save 9 percent of this income for capital investment. This should result in an increase of 3 percent in the following year's national income. But if this economy's population is also growing at 3 percent, then there is no improvement in per capita income. On the other hand, could this same nation suddenly reduce its birth rate so that it equalled the death rate, i.e., achieve population stability, the entire 3 percent increase would be felt on a per capita basis and continued growth at this rate could double the national income and per capita income in 23 years.

Age Distribution Effect. Table V of the previous chapter clearly illustrated that the higher the birth rate of a country the greater that portion of its population in the young dependents category, often exceeding 40 percent of the total. The greater the number of children the greater the demands on the economy for their feeding, clothing, health, and schools. As quantity requirements of these social and economic needs increase, their quality is generally sacrificed in some degree, further injuring national development. It is emphasized that this dependent sector of the population is a "consuming only" group. Not only is it too young to make substantial contribution to the economy as labor, but it draws on the female labor source in the form of childbirth and childcare requirements.

Conclusions about Economic Development/Population Relationship. As with agricultural development the key to general economic development is technology and the ability to exploit it. Many developing nations have been able to eke out savings from their national incomes for the capital investment required to create and use technology. However, the resulting gains have not been felt in per capita income growth because population increases have approached, equalled, and sometimes exceeded the national income gains. A reduction of the high birth rate common to most developing regions would reduce the dependency load without influencing the size of the labor force for years, giving more investment capital per laborer and in toto. It is reasonable to presume a resulting higher per capita income — the prerequisite to the greater savings required for economic takeoff.

Effect on World Unrest. That tranquillity and political stability can long exist in a region where a significant degree of starvation exists or looms imminent is unlikely. Food riots threatening the Government in India bear this out as they occur with greater frequency. The influence of poverty, chronic but not severe enough to deny maintenance of minimum nutritional levels, may, however, not be fully

agreed upon. There are those who would argue that poverty is only relative to the age and is judged within a man's own community by the standards of his own time. They conclude that the Asian peasant, therefore, is not discontented with spending all his waking hours in the struggle for food and shelter. If this argument ever had validity it has lost it in recent times. The placidity of the poor was permitted by isolation and absence of exposure to the larger world. Modern communication has broadened the awareness of rich and poor alike, and they can no longer ignore each other. Radio, television, and contact with teachers of more cosmopolitan backgrounds expose millions for the first time to a world in which conditions once considered unalterable can clearly be changed.[15] The term "rising expectations" has been much used but is difficult to improve upon in describing the resulting effect on the peasant who may still be poor, but is no longer blind. The situation is one that favors the germination of communism in the rural area where insurgency is most difficult to counter.

As mentioned previously, unlike economically advanced nations wherein urbanization follows a rise in the level of living, less-developed countries see urbanization begin *before* appreciable economic growth. Often urban unemployment is the counterpart of the rural unemployment that drives men who are often unskilled and illiterate to the city. This general movement is often premature and results in an excessive number of urban unemployed living in squalor. Such areas become breeding grounds for crime, violence, and political unrest as people who previously knew nothing but poverty now become aware of their relatively deprived situation. Their level of sophistication is just high enough to permit them to develop the conviction that something immediate can be done to effect rapid improvement. Democracy is difficult to maintain in such circumstances as no government can come into office without promising realization of these rising expectations, and none can remain in power without fulfilling them. When old aristocracy resists change, violent overthrow is the path often taken. Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. and/or the Chinese People's Republic is ever attempting to capitalize on such unrest. Soviet Russia points up her impressive economic gains without mention of the terrible human costs involved or the fact that she does not share the problems of population pressure. Communist China, on the other hand, would have other nations believe that her "superior" system allows maintenance of the world's largest population with little problem. Marxist ideological contradictions make an overt birth control program awkward for the CPR, but definite, if disguised, natality control effort has been underway ever since it became apparent that her population continued to outleap her meager economic progress.[16] The present uprisings do not support the position that her political stability is not adversely affected by her population pressures.

The overpopulation pressures of the less developed world would constitute a less direct problem for the developed world if the political unrest they create caused only intranational violence. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for a government with economic problems aggravated by population pressures to employ militant nationalism and take its people's minds off internal problems by action against other nations. Such foreign adventures may result in a war in which participation does not remain limited to a pair of poor nations.

Summary. The current population trends in the less-developed regions of

the world are generally having the following adverse effects:

1. These areas are losing the ability to feed themselves because population increases have more than offset increases in total domestic food production. Moreover, these regions are not productive enough to create the wealth with which to pay for imported food. As a result, the quantity of food grants required from surplus producers, principally the United States, approaches the limits of willingness and eventually, capability to provide. Even the most optimistic studies of future world food producing prospects warn that a further widening of the food gap, to the point of mass starvation, is likely unless a sharp drop in birth rates is achieved quickly.

2. The general economic development of these regions is being stalled because population growth allows no improvement in per capita incomes. The large percentage of dependent children that accompanies high birth rates is compounding the problem of capital accumulation.

3. Urbanization and the breakdown of rural isolation through modern communication has given the poor an awareness of their poverty. The failure of these developing economies to meet the resulting unrealistic "rising expectations" has made for political unrest which has the capability of growing into a world peace threat.

The United States provides foreign aid in all forms (grants; hard and soft loans, in kind; technical assistance) in amounts greater by a wide margin than those provided by any other nation. The objective of this aid, by definition, is to promote economic development of the recipients, both West-oriented and neutral or uncommitted. This objective, obviously shared by the recipient nations themselves, is being foiled in no small part by the excessive rate of population growth in almost all of these nations. Continuation of the present population trends can be expected to deny the less-developed countries the growth needed in per capita income to escape the poverty and hunger that means unrest, threat of war, and increased demands on the U.S. economy.

III — THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL

General. Any discussion, however convincing, illustrating the desirability or necessity of reducing population growth is only academic unless a course of action to accomplish the reduction is possible. Since achieving population stability by adjustment of the death rate is obviously an unacceptable approach, whether by direct death control or indirect (famine, war, disease), the only remaining avenue, i.e., birth control, must be examined for feasibility.

Methods Available. For most of time fertility rates remained at near natural levels in most of the world. Any adjustment came through factors affecting physiological capacity to reproduce. For example, the low fertility rates of certain areas of Africa and Mongolia, which stand out as exceptions to the rest of the less-developed world, are believed due to venereal diseases, malaria, and other debilitating illnesses.[1] However, as industrialization touched North America and Western Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries, fertility control in the form of delayed marriage, celibacy, and, in recent times, the use of contraceptives became more prevalent, especially in Europe. These methods, while not the only ones used, account for most of the difference between high-fertility and low-fertility countries.[2] Applied in the same

degree they will give the same results, therefore it has been suggested that the efforts to reduce fertility in less-developed regions should be concentrated on implementing these proven methods. Because established patterns in age at marriage and in celibacy (or the lack of it) in a particular culture would be, at the very least, difficult to change, contraception by elimination remains as the most promising avenue, especially where the need to reduce birth rates is urgent, as is the case in so many areas.

Until recently (1960), available methods of contraception were more suited to highly motivated and somewhat intellectual couples rather than to those whose lives were relatively unplanned because "all methods previously were contemporaneous with the act of intercourse."[3] This is to say that they had great shortcomings for use in less-developed regions where a requirement for conscientious recordkeeping or deliberate, repeated preventive measures are not acceptable in a contraception method for unsophisticated people having only borderline motivation. With the advent of the oral contraceptive, birth control procedure for the uneducated became simple enough to manage, but a significant amount of motivation is still required and the cost, if it has to be borne by the user, is often prohibitive to the very poor who frequently have the greatest need for contraception.

The contraceptive which probably holds the greatest potential for successful use in the less-developed regions is the recently developed intrauterine device (IUD) known in some of its forms as the "loop," the "bow," and the "spiral." These devices are highly effective, safe, cheap, and can be rapidly installed by paramedical workers. When they are removed the former wearer is restored to her original state of fertility potential.[4]

At this writing other contraceptives under development include injections and pills with long-term (up to 20 years) effects. It is clear that the level of contraceptive technology is not the obstacle to reduction of excessive growth.

Results of Family Planning Efforts. While practical means of fertility control are available and successful for individual couples, the important question in the face of the near universality of the population growth problem is whether birth control can be successfully implemented on a large scale in the developing areas. Family planning has been attempted in many areas with varying degrees of success. An investigation of these attempts serves to indicate what degree of influence on fertility a planned program can have and may reveal the characteristics most important to future successful campaigns.

Taiwan

In 1962 the island of Taiwan, off the coast of Mainland China, had a population of 12 million in an area of 14,000 square miles. Its high increase rate of almost 3 percent a year had been brought about by a death rate drop from 32 per 1,000 to 8 per 1,000 in just 40 years. Taiwan is a developing country, and the rapid population increase is a decided threat to further improvement in living standards. Recognizing this, the Provincial Health Department with the support of the Population Council, a private American foundation that advances scientific training and study in population matters, conducted an elaborate and extensive experiment in the large (population 300,000) city of Taichung. The object was to determine the need for motivation toward family planning and, if such motivation already existed, to

determine how best to aid the people in accomplishing their aim. Interviews of nearly 2,500 married women in the prime reproductive age group revealed that these women, as a group, wanted to have a moderate number of children, were having more children than they wanted, approved of the idea of family limitation, and were trying, but ineffectively, to limit the size of their families. The value of such limitation in terms of its economic welfare to their families was apparent, and these women were aware that they no longer had to have five to seven children in order to see three or four survive. These factors plus the absence of objections to birth control in principle accounted for the favorable motivation revealed.

The difference between attitude and behavior, i.e., desiring fewer children than they were having, was mainly due to lack of knowledge about family planning methods and the physiology of reproduction. Responding to this need the Provincial Health Department established a family planning program designed to reach the approximately 36,000 married women of childbearing age in the city and induce them to practice contraception. Of those women truly eligible, about 40 percent took up contraception in the first 13 months of the program. The cost of each acceptance was between $4 and $8, a small fraction of the eventual economic value of each prevented birth. It will be a few years before statistics can be generated to tell the full story, but enough is apparent already to show that fertility control can be substantially spread in a relatively short time and economically in an environment where motivation exists and limited means is removed as an obstacle.[5]

India

The Government of India has endorsed birth control for 36 years and has taken active measures since the advent of the 5-year plans in 1951. As far as can be ascertained the national program has not yet had significant effect on the birth rate. In view of the discouraging results in the face of seemingly large expenditures, it would be easy to conclude that in certain circumstances family planning on a national scale is not feasible. However, efforts in certain specific areas have had positive results and quickly. In Singur the birth rate declined from 42 to 37 per 1,000 in 4 years. The contrast in results between Singur and comparable regions is matched by the contrast in intensity of the respective programs. In the Singur case personal contacts by field workers, group discussions in the village, emphasis on husbands as well as wives, and continued contact were more characteristic than in the average village covered by the national program.[6]

Further prying into the efforts of the Indian Government tends to reveal how limited the Government's total effort actually is. For example, India's boast of 4,000 urban and rural clinics (1961)[7] appears impressive until it is matched with her population revealing an approximate ratio of 1 clinic for every 100,000 people. Further, these undersized efforts have frequently been reduced in effectiveness by miscalculation and naivete as exemplified by an attempt by the Indian Government to control birth through the rhythm method when it was well known that peasant women engaged in exhausting chores and generally lacking nourishment usually have irregular menstrual periods. To add to the folly, the Government issued colored beads to women to assist them in keeping track of the days. This failed for the simple reason that many women never looked at them until the lights were out at which time the colors were indistinguishable.[8]

Just as the case of Taichung, Taiwan does not prove that reasonable attempts at family planning always meet with immediate success, the discouraging results of India's Government-supported efforts do not prove that large-scale attempts at birth control always yield only negligible results. What is shown, were a dozen more large family planning attempts cited, is that the situation is never the same; it varies greatly in response with the degree of quality and quantity in the effort. It is clear that programs to effect a decline in high birth rates are not impossible, and if they are limited in effectiveness it has not been because they have met with active opposition on the part of governments or cultural groups at whom they were aimed. Japan, India, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Turkey, Egypt, and several other countries all have government-sponsored programs but have not been equally successful in them. This illustrates that while government approval and subsidy may be a contributing factor, it is no guarantee of success. Very often it fails because the simple provision of facilities is not enough. Birth control requires an attitude that for most less-developed countries does not exist in the required degree. The urgency of the population problem being what it is, these lands cannot afford to wait for the cultural change required to permit embracing the idea of birth control. Planned change must be implemented utilizing adult education, community development, mass communications, applied sociology, and anthropology.[9] This is an arduous task for a government that is already overburdened with problems. Many of these governments recognize in general sense the need for family planning but lack the economic strength and often the technique to carry out the comprehensive plan required. Perhaps the best expression of this is found in the statement of Pakistan President Ayub Khan, "We look to you (United States), a country like yours, to be able to combat this problem. If we continue to increase at the present rate, it will ultimately lead to a standard of living little better than that of animals."[10]

IV — PRESENT U.S. POLICY AND ITS BASIS

The Policy. The details of the unfavorable effects of rapid population growth on the economic development of recipients of U.S. foreign aid have been brought to the attention of various administrations at least as early as 1959.[1] President Eisenhower, in a December 1959 press conference, evidenced the response the Draper Committee received when it recommended the United States assist foreign countries — on request — in the formulation of plans designed to deal with the problem of rapid population growth. He stated that he could not "imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is *not* a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility."[2]

Signs of change in U.S. policy were clearly revealed at the United Nations General Assembly discussion on population problems in December 1962 when its statement indicated the United States wanted to know more and help others to know more about population trends and believed there was definite need for additional knowledge in the field of dealing with population problems. In addition, the United States offered to help other countries, upon request, to find potential sources of information and help them find ways and means of dealing with their specific population problems. It was made clear, however, that the United States would oppose any effort to dictate to another country its population policies.[3]

By 1965 it was apparent that the attitudes of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government had changed substantially since 1959. In his State of the Union message President Johnson said he would "seek new ways to use our knowledge to help deal with the explosion in world population and growing scarcity in world resources."[4] Perhaps the gain in world population of 385 million in that short 5 years and the growing awareness of the significance of such growth changed attitudes in many influential places, for former President Eisenhower has since reversed his 1959 opinion. At the present, however, the Government's position regarding foreign assistance remains extremely conservative and cautious. Effort is focused on research rather than actual provision of contraceptive materials and information. In the words of Dr. Philip Lee, Director of Health in the Office of Technical Cooperation and Research of the Agency for International Development, the AID "does not advocate family planning or any method of family planning . . . . The AID will not consider requests for contraceptive devices or equipment for manufacturing contraceptives."[5] The prospect of change was covered by AID Administrator David E. Bell who said, "The population field, as distinct from the food field is not a field in which AID has any major activities. I foresee no big change in the future."[6]

The Basis. A prerequisite for any U.S. foreign policy is that it have the support of, or at the very least the acceptance of, the American voting public. Further, a practice that is in any way less than appropriate for home consumption may be subject and vulnerable to criticism when programmed for implementation abroad. Thus, despite the awareness of the need for family planning in the less-developed countries the AID is held to conservative and passive measures, not because of the feeling abroad, but because of feeling at home. Government involvement in family planning is limited by: (1) Catholic opposition to artificial means of birth control and (2) a belief that birth control could lead to "national moral degeneration."[7] It is offered that the second obstacle may be at least partially a manifestation of more traditional Protestant and other non-Catholic views whether or not these views match the current stated positions of their respective churches, for every Christian denomination has at one time or another in the past opposed birth control. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church is the only major religious body whose official position is an obstacle to the more active measures by the Government required for an effective program. Any other obstacle does not nearly approach it in formidability.

It must be made clear that the Vatican is not arbitrarily against all forms of control on birth. The following statement by Pope Pius XII seems to indicate a greater concern with methods of family planning rather than the concept itself: "We affirm the legitimacy and at the same time, the limits — in truth very wide — of a regulation of offspring which, unlike so-called birth control, is compatible with the law of God. One may even hope that science will succeed in providing this licit rhythm method with a sufficiently secure basis."[8] Only sexual continence and the rhythm method, which requires a scheduled degree of it, are justified in the Church's eyes. While the former is obviously a 100 percent effective contraceptive, the latter depends on adherence to schedule, which is anathema to the sex urge. This, plus the lack of precision of the menstrual cycle (23-

34 percent of women are irregnlar),[9] makes the rhythm method far inferior to other available methods of contraception even for motivated couples, let alone the poor and ignorant of the less-developed areas. In short, an effective family planning program must incorporate artificial contraception which is forbidden by Church rules. In the numerous state-sponsored clinics which receive Federal support, artifieial hirth control instruction and supplies are offered irrespective of religious affiliation of the recipient since a Government agency cannot properly compel persons to conform to the precepts of any church. Bound by its faith to guide its communicants in accordance with the tradition it has received, the Catholic Church is naturally sensitive to Government involvement. The situation has led to sharp statements from authoritative sources. In the recent (October 1966) meeting of the Catholic bishops in Washington, denunciation in no uncertain terms was made of the Johnson Administration's efforts in the area of domestic family planning. "Far from merely seeking to provide information in response to requests from the needy," the bishops charged, "government activities increasingly seek to persuade and even coerce the underprivileged to practice birth control." The bishops further argued that this trend threatens the free choice of spouses to determine the size of their families and endangers the right of human privacy. The thesis of the statement appeared to be that "government far exceeds its proper role." This and a similar statement by Bishop John Wright of Pittsbnrgh and an associated concerted campaign by the Catholic bishops of Pennsylvania in response to that state's recent effort to institnte broadscale family planning aid have had no small effect on Administration officials.[10] But there is serious question as to how much heed in administrative circles should he given these strongly stated positions. First, do they accurately reflect the true feelings of American Catholics, and second, how much accommodation of religious interests is appropriate in a pluralistic society such as ours?

The Fallacy. Perhaps more than any other major religious body in the United States, the familial attitndes and behavior of Catholics are strongly influenced by the teachings of their chureh. This is not to say that conformity is perfect, but adherence until recently to the Church teaching regarding contraception is exemplified by the results of a 1955 survey conducted by the University of Michigan Program for Research in Population and Human Ecology. This study revealed that among a natioual sample of Catholics, Protestants, and Jews, who felt little different on the average as to the number of children considered ideal for Americans, there was great distinction on the part of Catholics as to use of contraceptive methods not specifically approved by the Catholic Church. Only 29 percent reported such usage as opposed to 69 and 84 percent for Protestants and Jews, respectively.[11] However, according to Princeton University's Dr. Charles Westoff, a 1966 nationwide survey reveals that 53 percent of married Catholic women aged 18 to 39 use contraceptives in defiance of church doctrine. Since Dr. Westoff, in his report to the Notre Dame conference on population in November 1966, stated that this represents an increase of 22 percent in 11 years,[12] his figures appear in consonance with the 1955 survey. Assuming this survey correctly reflects the majority practice of American Catholics, then it is not surprising that on the subject of the position of the Roman Catholic Church

on the use of presently unauthorized birth control methods, such as pills, a 1965 survey by Dr. George Gallup revealed that most Catholics would like to see their church's stance changed.[13] More important, this same survey revealed the majority of Catholics to *favor* Federal Government aid to both states and other countries upon request.[14] It would appear that those Catholic prelates who have vigorously opposed the Federal Government's activity in family planning, domestic and foreign, are not truly representative of American Catholics.

Disregarding religious affiliation, contraception is practiced and approved by the overwhelming majority of American citizens. Similarly, Gallup Poll reports since 1939 have indicated a majority (81 percent in 1965) favor Federal Government assistance in family planning, and the trend of approval is upward.[15] This must be respected over the pressure of any religious group. The right of the Catholic Church to persuade all men to act in accordance with its principles must be honored and protected by government, but any attempt to exert undue pressure on political processes in an effort to bring legislation and other public affairs into conformity with its teachings is neither acceptable by the Nation or required by the doctrine of the Catholic Church.[16]

V — CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The conclusion of this paper is that in many areas of the less-developed world the population problem is rapidly assuming proportions that will not only render aid ineffective for economic development, but will eventually make it inadequate to prevent mass starvation. The ensuing unrest will constitute a threat to world peace and is therefore a danger to the interests of the United States.

Implementing large-scale birth control in areas needing it is difficult but not impossible, as is revealed by the generally undersized efforts of the governments of many less-developed nations whose family planning attempts are limited by the unfavorable ratio of problems to resources. Meanwhile, the nation with the greatest resources and the demonstrated willingness to employ them in other forms of assistance limits itself to a passive program that falls infinitely short of what is required. Such a policy is not dictated by hostility on the part of prospective recipients toward family planning or by the failure of the Johnson Administration to appreciate the nature and magnitude of the problem. Rather, it is the result of an exaggerated concern over opposition from prelates of the Catholic Church, who do not accurately reflect the attitude of American Catholics, and who by no means speak for the view of U.S. voters as a whole. A more active effort is entirely acceptable to Americans as part of foreign policy toward nations suffering from the problem of excessive population growth.

It is therefore recommended that the United States incorporate a policy of advocating and materially and directly supporting family planning in its dealings with foreign nations receiving U.S. aid. Acceptance of birth control implementation as a prerequisite to eligibility to receive other forms of help is not suggested. However, if a nation receiving U.S. economic aid for development is clearly being blocked from achieving progress toward such development by excessive population growth, the U.S. Ambassador, AID representatives, and country team members must be authorized and even directed to influence such governments

toward appropriate family planning measures.

The details of the nature of suitable programs for this form of aid are beyond the scope of this paper, but it can be safely stated that to be effective they must entail an effort as comprehensive as economic development itself. The cost of such an effort may be high, but the price of inaction may be intolerable.

FOOTNOTES

I — TRENDS IN WORLD POPULATION

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
5. Ronald Freedman, ed., *Population: the Vital Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 74-76.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
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8. *Ibid.*

II — IMPACT OF WORLD POPULATION TRENDS

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2. Karel Holbik, *An Evaluation of Major Foreign Aid Programs* (Padua: Cedam, 1966), p. 547.
3. Lester R. Brown, "World Population and Food Supplies, 1980," *American Society of Agronomy*, February 1965, p. 4.
4. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, *The State of Food and Agriculture, 1965* (Rome: 1965), p. 3.
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6. Brown, p. 6.
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15. Ben H. Bagdikian, *In the Midst of Plenty: the Poor in America* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 173.
16. Alan R. Plotnick, "Malthus, Marx, and Mao — Red China's Population and Ideology," *Challenge*, June 1964, p. 11.

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5. Bernard Berelson and Ronald Freedman, "A Study in Fertility Control," *Scientific American*, May 1964, p. 29-37.
6. J. Mayone Stycos, "Population and Family Planning Programs in Newly Developing Countries," Ronald Freedman, ed., *Population: the Vital Revolution* (Garden City N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 172.
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Ψ

THE BAROMETER

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Ψ

COLD WAR OPERATIONS: THE POLITICS OF COMMUNIST CONFRONTATION

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick

Part III — The Sino-Soviet Split

(A series of eight lectures by Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick of the Political Science Department, Brown University, given at the United States Naval War College during the 1966-67 term as a part of the Electives Program. These lectures are selected from those in a course entitled *Cold War Operations* which Professor Kirkpatrick presents at Brown. This is the third lecture, and the others will be published in the next five issues.)

One of the important controveries in the world today, and one which underlines the thesis that there is just as intensive a cold war going on within the so-called Communist bloc as there is between the Communists and ourselves, is the Sino-Soviet split.

There are still those who question whether this is a serious disagreement or whether it is camouflage to lull us into a state of euphoria. There are also those who say, "Should we really worry about China? It probably will not stay Communist and maybe this problem will disappear with time." The United States reacted similarly after the Bolsheviks took over Russia. We waited 17 years before we recognized their Communist system of government.

It is only realistic to acknowledge that it is possible that the Chinese and the Soviets could solve their differences just as it was possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to be aligned in World War II. However, it is much more likely that the Chinese and the Russians may fight at some point in the future rather than be aligned. The issues between them are serious — perhaps more serious from a nationalistic point of view than from ideological differences over communism.

Trouble between China and Russia started at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the early stages of the proceedings a message from Mao was read to the assembled parties of the world praising the leadership of Josef Stalin, then deceased some 3 years, for his years of service as the spokesman of the Communist world. Mikoyan started off the fireworks by a fairly severe criticism of Stalin. Then Khrushchev, in a 6½ hour speech, exposed the evils of Stalin. The Chinese were furious over their loss of face for it was obvious to all that they had not been advised of the Russian position in advance.

This may well have been Khrushchev on his own. Here was a politician who operated often on political whims and instincts without taking his colleagues into his confidence. This particular trait was part of the reason for his downfall in 1964. It is possible, and even probable, that Khrushchev did consult with some of his colleagues before denouncing Stalin. But it is most unlikely that he followed normal Party procedures of clearing it with the Presidium and then the Central Committee. We know that the Sino-Soviet split was one of the reasons for Khrushchev's removal in 1964, and precipitation of this in 1956 probably was very important in this regard.

It is interesting to note that in that same year, 1956, the Chinese took what would have appeared to have been diametrically opposite positions during the Polish and the Hungarian revolts. In Poland the Central Committee decided to recall Gomulka to his post as Party Secretary. He had been out for nearly 8 years on the orders of the Russians. The Poles decided they were going to exercise their independence from the Soviet Union. The Russians were sufficiently concerned by this display of independence to alert troops along the border and had ordered one of the divisions in Poland to start to move on Warsaw.

Apparently the Chinese put some considerable pressure on the Russians at this time not to use force against Poland on the thesis that this was an intraparty squabble and that each of the Communist Parties of the world had a right to make its own decisions while following the general lead of the Russian party. How effective their pressure was and whether Khrushchev, Molotov, and Mikoyan, who went to Warsaw to try to force the Poles'

hand, decided not to use force because of Chinese pressure we do not know to this time. But the Chinese made their voice heard in the affairs of European Communist Parties.

The Chinese took an opposite position in the Hungarian revolution and urged the Russians to use force, because the Communist Party was no longer an effective factor, and Hungary threatened to break away from the Communist bloc.

These instances of Chinese pressure are illustrative of another issue between China and the Soviet Union. This is the extent to which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is recognized as the world leader and should exercise full authority or the extent to which there should be independent roads to socialism. The Chinese believe that the national Parties should exercise a certain degree of independence, although at that time they still acknowledged that the Russian Party was the one to follow.

In June of 1960, Khrushchev attacked the Chinese at a meeting of the Parties that took place at Bucharest. This was the first assault by the Russians on the Chinese and preceded by just 2 months an even more direct indication of the break: the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from China. The Chinese regarded the withdrawal of technicians as an unfriendly act. The Russians, as they have done on more than one occasion around the world, left several projects unfinished. The Chinese did not have the capability to finish some of these projects. The Chinese nuclear program was undoubtedly affected. The Chinese, as they have demonstrated in recent years, had the capability to complete the nuclear program on their own, but Russian assistance was valuable.

In November 1960 there was a meeting of 81 Communist Parties in Moscow. This group recognized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the world socialist movement. They reiterated their faith in peaceful coexistence as the basic foreign policy for the Communist world and minimized the necessity of violence. This was an important issue between the Chinese and the Soviets. The Chinese kept saying the way to win this issue was to go to war. They called the United States a paper tiger and chided the Russians for being concerned unnecessarily about American strength. According to Peking, the real solution to world revolution was to fall back on Lenin's principle that the ultimate revolutionary effort had to come through

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., was educated at Princeton University; he is presently Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

Prior to World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick worked for the U.S. News Publishing Corporation and during the war served in the Office of Strategic Services on the staff of Gen. Omar Bradley's 12th Army Group as intelligence briefing officer. At the end of World War II he returned briefly to the U.S. News as editor of *World Report* and then went to the CIA where he served in a variety of positions, including Division Chief, Assistant Director, Executive Assistant to the Director, Inspector General, and, from 1962 to 1965, Executive Director. In 1965 he left the CIA to become Professor of Political Science at Brown University.

For his service in World War II, Professor Kirkpatrick received the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, European Theater Ribbon with five battle stars, and both the French and Belgian Croix de Guerre. In March 1960 Professor Kirkpatrick was chosen by the National Service League as one of the ten outstanding career officers in the Federal Government.

violence. However, as late as 1960 the Chinese, while still preaching violence, were willing to recognize the Russian thesis of peaceful coexistence as the principal base for the Communist foreign policy, although they did stress that occasions would come when the wars of national liberation and violence were necessary.

The Chinese almost immediately after the conference of November 1960 attacked the Russians openly, describing them as opportunists and revisionists — two very critical words in the semantics of communism. China criticized Russian aid to both India and to the United Arab Republic and openly denounced peaceful coexistence as nothing but a tactical weapon. This was not directed towards undermining the unity of the socialist world as much as it was a flag of independence from Peking.

The following year, 1961, a more serious issue developed at the 22nd Party Congress of the Soviet Union. Albania was publicly criticized by the Russians. This brought China to the defense of Albania. They rebuked the Russians for attacking Albania publicly.

The following year the most important development in the Sino-Soviet split was over the Cuban missile crisis. When the Russians decided to withdraw their missiles, the Chinese were outspoken and blunt in their criticism saying the Russians had been frightened by a paper tiger. The Russians replied, "Yes, a paper tiger with nuclear teeth." This exchange brought the break much more into the open and sowed more seeds of fragmentation in the Communist Parties of the world. The Sino-Soviet split was not the sole factor in fragmenting the Communist Parties. Prior to the break Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the 20th Party Congress had gone a long way toward undermining unity in the Communist Parties around the world. The attack on Stalin was most devastating from the point of view of Communist ideology. It was something akin to the "God is dead" argument in Christianity. It destroyed belief in a man who had been put on a pedestal to every Communist Party in the world and whose words to that time had had the validity of the Gospel.

In June of 1963, nearly a year after the Cuban missile crisis and a little short of 2 years after the 22nd Party Congress, the Chinese openly rebuked the Russians on Albania in a statement carefully studied by every Communist Party in the world. The Russians asked the Chinese to Moscow for talks. For a period of 15 days they met periodically. Little information on what transpired seeped to the non-Communist world. The Western press reported on the Chinese arrivals and departures at the place of meeting, and that's about all that was heard about it. The Chinese left Moscow and there was no announcement. Therefore it can be assumed that the meetings were a failure and that there was no area for rapproachment or détente between these two parties. The Test Ban Treaty of 1963 further widened the breach. The Chinese looked upon the Russian signature to the Test Ban Treaty as a direct affront. They felt that the Russians were trying — as indeed they were — to prevent the Chinese from acquiring their own nuclear capability.

The dispute over the Test Ban Treaty was followed in less than a month by a series of articles in China reporting on the break with Russia. These commentaries were very lengthy: 20,000 to 30,000 word attacks on the Soviet Union.

The following year (1964) was one of attack and counterattack. Race was brought into the issue, both sides accus-

ing the other side of racism — the Chinese saying that the Russians were white like the Americans and were racists like the Americans, the Russians saying that the Chinese were trying to make race an issue and were trying to bring in all of the nonwhite races. In the attacks that went on in the spring and summer of 1964 the Chinese accused Khrushchev of trying to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union, reiterating the very often repeated thesis that this was revisionist, opportunist, and abondonment of Marxism-Leninism. On 14 October 1964 Khrushchev was dismissed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Khrushchev dismissal caught everybody by surprise. While I was still with the CIA every time I talked to a War College audience, or for that matter to any audience, the question came up, "Did we know in advance about Khrushchev's dismissal?" The quickest way to answer it was to say, "No, and neither did he."

These are the facts, and the chronology went something like this: On Wednesday afternoon, 12 October, the first report from Moscow was received in Washington and was rather vague. The report said there had been issued a summons for the General Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Republics of the U.S.S.R. to report to Moscow for a very urgent meeting. All members of the Central Committee were told to drop what they were doing as there was nothing as important as the meeting in Moscow. Almost simultaneously came reports from the Western press in Moscow. Peter Grose of *The New York Times* called his paper to say that something was brewing in the Kremlin: that high party officials were arriving for a special meeting, and there was a lot of speculation in the foreign diplomatic corps in Moscow. That was about all of the advance indication that something was happening.

There was little speculation this might involve the removal of Khrushchev. At the time he was vacationing in Sochi on the Black Sea and was asked to return to Moscow by the Presidium. He arrived to be greeted at the airport by KGB officers — which surely must be an indication to most Soviet officials that things are not as they should be — and was escorted to the meeting.

The Presidium met Wednesday night, and Thursday Khrushchev defended his policies and conduct. He was attacked for (1) being responsible for the Sino-Soviet split or at least for aggravating it; (2) his miscalculation on Cuba; (3) the failure of his agricultural program, the New Lands particularly; (4) the Russian economic situation; and (5) for his cult of personality. Thursday the Central Committee was summoned to meet. Khrushchev felt that the Central Committee would back him. The Kosygin-Brezhnev group, who were most concerned about Khrushchev's unorthodox methods, apparently had polled the Central Committee well in advance, and the vote went against Khrushchev. He resigned and went quietly, which was probably the better part of valor under those circumstances.

Immediately following Khrushchev's removal the Russians made a major effort to heal the Chinese breach. In February of 1965 Kosygin went to China to try to persuade the Chinese to open discussions. Kosygin urged the Chinese to attend the meeting of the 19 Parties in Moscow on 29 February. They refused, and this is probably where one might say the divorce was irrevocable.

In September 1965 the Soviets mediated the Kashmir war between India and Pakistan. This again was offensive

to the Chinese who consider that area in their sphere of influence. The Chinese bitterly resented not only Soviet cultivation of India but even more so their cultivation or attempted cultivation of Indonesia, which again the Chinese regard as right within their sphere of influence. It was during this period prior to the ill-fated Indonesian revolt that Chinese and Indonesian relations were strained over the Chinese in Indonesia, a population of about three million. The Indonesians were putting pressure on their Chinese residents, as had most of the countries with large overseas Chinese populations. The Chinese interpreted Russian aid to Indonesia as being a direct affront.

On the other side, the Russians wanted an invitation to the Afro-Asian meeting in Algiers, and the Chinese refused on the grounds that they are not an Asiatic power. The Algiers meeting was scuttled on this issue.

In February of 1966 the Chinese accused the Russians of being an ally of the United States and of trying to encircle China.

The Sino-Soviet dispute has become increasingly critical. There has been steady friction between the two powers over military aid to Vietnam, and this arugment has gone through some amazing convolutions. The Chinese charge the Russians a fee for transshipment across China by rail, not allowing them to overfly China to take supplies to North Vietnam. At one point they urged the Russians to establish a joint Sino-Soviet Fleet Headquarters in the Pacific, which the Russians interpreted as a Chinese entrapment to get them into a war with the United States over the Formosa Straits. And now one presumes that as part of the issue of aid to Vietnam the Chinese are undoubtedly saying to Moscow, "If you want to give them aid, why don't you ship all of it in by sea?" Again the Russians probably see behind this that this is another attempt to aggravate the issue with the United States.

The Communist Parties of the world are badly divided as a result of the differences between Russia and China. There are two Communist Parties in Belgium with identical names; one is pro-Peking and one is pro-Russian. Intensive efforts are made by Russia and China to line up support. The Russians exert great pressure diplomatically and carefully to get support from not only the European, but the Central Asian Communist Parties. They have put pressure on the Koreans, Japanese, and the North Vietnamese to align with Moscow rather than Peking.

What are the underlying factors behind the differences between Russia and China? Underlying factor number one is national. These two great powers have a 5,000-mile common border and a history of frontier trouble. They are suffering from nationalistic pangs and are uneasy neighbors. It was announced that there were 150 border incidents in 1965 between China and Russia. This would involve everything from a couple of guards shouting at each other to shooting episodes. The boundary between Russia and China has, through its history, been an area of raids and undeclared wars involving occasionally several thousand men on both sides. Both sides apparently are doing a good deal of infiltrating across the border, particularly in some of the disputed areas – Sinkiang being one area which the Russians through the years have always been terribly interested in. The Chinese have acknowledged the fact that they are exporting from Eastern China into that area more and more young men in order to settle it and to develop their operations in that area. John McCone, the former Director of CIA, who visited the Soviet Union on more than one occasion as Chairman of

the Atomic Energy Commission, reported that his opposite number in the U.S.S.R., in taking him on a tour of some of the Soviet nuclear installations, pointed out the new Russian settlements on the Russian side of the Chinese border and implied they were there for defensive purposes. It is generally believed that some of the Soviet military exercises in the maritime provinces and in Siberia have been based not only on possible attack by the United States but also possible attack by China.

Outer Mongolia has become one of the critical issues. The Chinese were caught redhanded trying to foment a revolt in Outer Mongolia. It is only 600 miles from Peking, providing a good military reason for proselyting. In 1962 and 1963 the Chinese mounted a major effort to try and break Outer Mongolia away from the Soviet Union with the result that some 6,000 Chinese were expelled by the Government in Ulan Bator.

Perhaps what has come home much more solidly to the Russians as a fundamental issue was the fact that during one of Khrushchev's visits to China the Chinese produced a map of the "inner kingdom" of 1840 which was China before the commencement of the extraction of concessions by the Western Powers. The inner kingdom was the last of China's former greatness, it being so-called because the outer kingdom was composed of countries like Thailand, and so on, which came and paid homage to Peking and acknowledged the superior role of the Chinese. The Chinese made it clear to the Russians that they want to return to this status of 1840. This would mean 500,000 square miles of Soviet territory returned to China: specifically in south-central Asia, eastern Kazakistan, eastern Khirgistan, eastern Uzbekistan, and most of Tadzikistan. Included also would be Outer Mongolia, the Soviet maritime provinces, Sakhalin, Korea, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Sulu Archipelago, Southeast Asia including Singapore, the Andaman Islands, and Burma. And, of course, the Chinese want the Indian border countries of Nepal, Sikim, and Bhutan.

One could say such expansionist ideas are ridiculous from the point of view that they could never really get this territory back, even as allied states. There is question whether China is expansionist. On the other hand, China is a growing power. Over the years undoubtedly it will increase in strength. There is sympathy in some of these different areas for China and admiration for its progress. As a platform, a return to the days of the "inner kingdom" does not seem to be unreasonable from a Chinese point of view.

Fundamental to the Sino-Soviet split and an aspect which affects us to a degree is the antiforeign feeling in China. This is a basic and important factor in Chinese foreign policy today. The Chinese are a very proud people. They are proud of the fact that they have been a seat for their own civilization for 3,000 years while Western civilization has shifted in its center from the eastern Mediterranean further west. They are disdainful of the accomplishments of others, even though they probably would acknowledge that some of their scientific achievements have come from the West. They are bitter about the dismemberment of China. They have described the Russians as among the predators of China, and they have described the Russians as traitors, whereas they have occasionally described the United States as a bold and respected enemy. So there is this very great intensity of feeling about the concessions extracted from China starting with the Opium Wars of the 1840's and extending through the Boxer Rebellion to the end of World War I

when Britain, France, the United States, Germany, Russia, Portugal, and so on, literally told the Chinese Government what to do and made them do it by force of arms. Chinese ideological campaigns conducted internally in the factories and in the villages constantly hammer at the white devil and must be molding these people to a fairly major degree.

There are the ideological differences between Russia and China. Some of these are quite fundamental today. But basic to it is the fact that Mao looks upon himself as the leader of communism for the underdeveloped countries based upon an agrarian revolt and distinguishes his revolt from the Russian revolution by the fact that he depended more on the peasants while the Russians depended more on the workers. It is obvious that Mao wants China to be leader of the underdeveloped countries. The Chinese have told the Africans, the Southeast Asians, and others that they are the leaders rather than the Russians. The Chinese claim that they are still revolutionary, and the Russians are conservative and have forsaken Marxism-Leninism.

The Russians say they are going to achieve communization of the world by peaceful coexistence. The Chinese say they are going to achieve it by force. The Russians acknowledge separate roads to socialism. The Chinese do also but say socialism must be through the wars of national liberalization. At one point they agreed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was to be the model. In recent years the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, according to the Chinese, is revisionist.

Before the 23rd Party Congress held in March 1966, there was a most interesting cold war operation carried out by the Russians. In the lower level Party meetings held in the Soviet Union in preparation in the cells, districts, and Republics, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union circulated a document on the differences with China. The text of this document eventually leaked --- deliberately leaked in my opinion — to the West. The document was an attack right across the board on all the issues with China. One of the key points was that it had started as a difference between fraternal parties, but the Chinese had raised the level of the difference to where it was now a difference between national states. This is fundamental in looking at the Sino-Soviet split and at their drive for world communism. In the Communist world it is proper to have differences between fraternal parties, but when this is elevated to the national difference between states it becomes more serious and could reach the point of renunciation of their mutual security pact.

In the balance sheet on world communism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is still restrained in criticisms of China. The Chinese are not so restrained. The Russians are still offering to talk to the Chinese, but the Chinese are going more and more into solid isolation and refusing to talk to the Russians at all.

In the world Communist effort, both of these powers offer aid and assistance to other countries. Russian aid is extensive to the underdeveloped nations of the world and is moderately good. Some Russian aid has been quite good, but they have been criticized by the recipients for the quality of the aid and for the slowness in delivery. Chinese aid, on the contrary, is much more a talking point than an actuality. The Chinese have not been able to deliver, but they talk a great deal about it.

An example of Russian aid is a $50 million plant in Ghana for building prefabricated houses built prior to the anti-Nkrumah revolution. It now stands there as a monument to Russian aid.

There is nohody to run it. It is too complicated for the Ghanaians to run. The Soviet technicians were expelled at the time of the revolt. It is too complicated, and the houses it would build nobody in Ghana could buy.

Aid to North Vietnam is a critical issue among the Communist Parties of the world. There is little question about the types of aid the Russians are pouring in, especially antiaircraft missiles, antiaircraft artillery, and technicians. It is hard to say how many technicians are in North Vietnam at the present time. There may be at least 40,000 Chinese technicians. There must be thousands of Russian technicians to help set up and train the North Vietnamese in the missile sites. This is an issue, and an issue which is deep between the two in trying to recruit world communism hehind aid to North Vietnam. The 23rd Party Congress talked of volunteers for Vietnam, and it appears that this issue is now caught in the Sino-Soviet split by neither side wanting to encourage the other to send volunteers for fear it will give them a foothold which cannot be dislodged.

In the ideological split it is interesting to note that the Russians are allowing increasingly greater freedoms in their country. The youth of Russia are free in their comments on the Government and its effectiveness. The Chinese are increasingly restrictive. The Russians are in the process of restoring some private enterprise and private holdings. One of the purge effects in China has been to eliminate some of the few private holdings that were still remaining. The Chinese, when they took over industry in China, allowed some of the former capitalists to retain at least an income from their companies, and the result was the rather strange situation of millionaires in Communist China.

One of the irritants in this split between these two powers came at the time of the "Great Leap Forward" and the Chinese experiment with agricultural communes and with backyard industry. The Rusisans were openly disdainful. Chinese official comments indicated that this was considered to be a most unfriendly gesture.

Relations with the United States is one of the very important aspects of this split. The Chinese believe the Russians are collaborating with us in erecting a curtain around China, trying to contain them with military power, and developing a system of alliances around China. The Russians, on the other hand, are undoubtedly being driven closer to us by the Chinese issue, by the fact that they are fearful of China and will become increasingly fearful as the Chinese develop their capability for delivery of nuclear weapons. Chinese development of nuclear-tipped missiles will affect all Asia. It is inconceivable that India and Japan will be able to watch the Chinese develop a delivery capacity for nuclear weapons without deciding that they have to have something of a similar nature for themselves. This, of course, in one of the time factors involved, as long as the Vietnamese war poses an issue between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Relations with the United States involve this progression of developments. You can always say, "Well the Chinese would not agree to any restraint on nuclear developments." That may be true. But it is not certain that they would be prepared to go into a total isolation at the risk of possibly greater force being brought to bear on them. We cannot prevent them from developing their own nuclear capability short of general war. The Russians want an agreement with the United States. They would like to see an agreement which would keep the rest of the world from

developing nuclear weapons, exclusive of China and France. This is a serious and fundamental basis of Russian foreign policy. The Russians would like to have greater trade with the United States and trade on a credit basis for some of the things that they need. Although occasionally obscured by the many issues in the cold war, we nevertheless are working with the Russians in many different fields on a collaborative basis. The Russians would very much like to have the Vietnamese war settled on one basis or another as quickly as possible, as long as it does not involve capitulation of North Vietnam. In late 1964 they made a major effort to try and get Chinese terms for Vietnamese peace and were denounced for their pains as being U.S. lackeys. At that time they used India and other intermediaries.

The Chinese did not look with favor on the visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister to the Vatican because they would again interpret this as revisionist. I believe that Mao once said to Stalin, "How many divisions does the Pope have?" which is practically a plagiarism from what Stalin said to Churchill on the same subject during World War II.

In conclusion, we can always assume that through threat or necessity these two powers could conceivably once again align themselves. There are so many basic issues between the two that the possibilities of this are very remote at the present time. The national issue I would rank as the higher issue in the split between Russia and China. But the split of the Communist Parties and Russian and Chinese competition for their support we should never ignore.

Both Russia and China are run by very realistic men. These are men who achieved power the hard way. They want to stay there. They are not going to get themselves involved in a miscalculation which might result in their elimination.

As far as the effect of the Sino-Soviet split on relations with the United States is concerned, it is predictable that the more intense this split becomes the more the danger. The Soviet Union would like an understanding with the United States to gain more freedom to cope with China. Russia wants to avoid threats from both East and West. We occasionally underestimate Soviet concern over Germany and the fact that this is one of the key factors in Soviet foreign policy. Russians believe Germany can be a danger to Russia. Stalin said during World War II that the Germans in 15 years would recover and once again be a threat. Russia will worry about Germany as long as there is no agreement with the United States on the German future.

What about a possibility of a general war between Russia and China? There will be no general war unless there is a war which escalates. It is quite conceivable they can have extensive border wars without resorting to nuclear weapons. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that they would use tactical weapons in border wars if they felt they could do that without using the larger weapons.

What about the Vietnamese war in this split? One of the factors that undoubtedly is deterring any discussions on Vietnam is China. The Russians might discuss Vietnam if they could figure a way to get into those discussions without being accused by China of selling the North Vietnamese down the river. This, of course, is one of the key problems in negotiating with the Communists. What good Communist can stand up in Hanoi or Peking and say we ought to negotiate today without being called either revisionist or capitalist? The key issue is the pressure that must be brought on Hanoi to allow

the North Vietnamese to negotiate. The North Vietnamese probably feel they cannot negotiate without at least a tacit agreement from the Chinese that they will not openly intervene if a cease-fire is arranged.

The question often put forward is, "Is is possible that the Chinese and the Russians are negotiating secretly?" The answer is obviously "Yes." These are two countries that have grown up with a great deal of clandestine apparatus; a large number of their leaders are clandestinely oriented and have survived only by being clandestine. Secret negotiations are fundamental to the Communist way of life. They believe open negotiations are impractical, and one of their axioms is, "What is secret is important; what is open is not." There may be indirect contacts between the two, but they are not fundamental or far reaching.

There is a general feeling the Communists do not worry about world opinion. Some Communists worry about world opinion more than the other Communists, and we have a key point right in this issue. The Russians have progressively become more concerned about world opinion. Not that they will not ignore it if it is important from a tactical point of view to gain a major victory and taking drastic action like putting down the Hungarian revolt. Generally speaking, however, the Russians do worry about respectability. They recognize the necessity of international respect in their dealings. They gained a tremendous amount of respect in settling the Kashmir war. So this is a factor also between Russia and China.

So what do we find in the Sino-Soviet split? We find China isolated. The increasing isolation of China has as many dangers as bringing China more into the world family. The United States during the last year has made several gestures to the Chinese to try and indicate at least a receptivity to the opening of discussions of China. These have all been bluntly and thoroughly rejected. We offered to allow Chinese journalists to come to this country if they allowed American journalists to go there. We offered an exchange of medical and technical persons. We indicated an openmindedness to greater discussions between diplomatic representatives. This has all been categorically rejected.

One of the major issues, of course, between the United States and China, an issue which cannot but affect Sino-Soviet relations, is Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalists. Whether it will ever be possible for the Chinese Communists to enter the United Nations as long as Taiwan is a member is a very serious question. We can offer them membership in the United Nations, but if we insisted that the Chinese Nationalists should remain a member it is doubtful whether the Chinese would join. So the future trend is towards an increasing isolation of China. We could find ourselves faced with developments in Asia which will have far-reaching effects that both Russia and the United States will have to work together to solve.

The Sino-Soviet split is probably as serious an issue, with its far-reaching repercussions, as anything in the world today. It is certainly of far greater and longer term importance than some of the lesser conflagrations that we are going to be faced with in other parts of the world in time to come.



NATIONALISM VERSUS COMMUNISM IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

When after World War II communism emerged as a powerful force in China, it engendered great puzzlement on the part of many people. First of all, China did not (and still does not) fit the classical example of an industrialized country with a politically conscious proletariat which Karl Marx envisioned as the breeding ground for communism. Furthermore, it seemed incongruous that communism, with its attack on the "feudal" institution of the family and on individual freedom, could ever be accepted by the Chinese people in view of traditional Chinese ethics and social mores. The official feeling of the U.S. Government is indicated in Secretary of State Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" in the Department of State's 1949 *White Paper on China:*

> We continue to believe that, however tragic may be the immediate future of China and however ruthlessly a major portion of this great people may be exploited by a party in the interest of a foreign imperialism, ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke.[1]

Although the validity of Marx's assumptions regarding the requisite inputs for a successful Communist movement may be easily challenged, the scope of this paper will be limited to Chinese communism as it exists and to what constitutes Chinese communism. The purpose of this paper is to examine the actions of the Chinese Communists from the time just prior to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party until the present in an effort to ascertain the objectives of Chinese foreign policy and the influence of nationalism versus communism in the formulation of those objectives.

The establishment of communism in China will be viewed through the intellectual evolutions of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, the founders of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao Tse-tung's foreign policy pronouncements and his aspirations for China will be examined. Events associated with the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's border involvements with her neighbors will be analyzed to determine the nationalistic and communistic aspects of each. Finally, conclusions are drawn which identify an apparent nationalistic ambition to reestablish something similar to the "Middle Kingdom" concept from Chinese dynastic history and explain the role of Chinese Communism in fulfilling this ambition.

I — NATIONALISM BEGETS COMMUNISM

Throughout the 20th century China has been experiencing a great revolution which has affected every aspect of life in that ancient civilization. China's general impotence in the face of Western incursions led to frustration, embarrassment, and a desire for escape from the old traditional Chinese culture, which was considered to be the basis of China's weakness. The rising nationalism of the 20th century led to the overthrow of the Manchus in 1911. This was followed by the establishment of a Republic in 1912, which proved to be completely ineffectual. The latest chapter of this revolution, which is still being written, had its beginning with the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.

Marxism-Leninism. The beginnings of Marxism-Leninism in China are intimately connected with the intellectual evolution of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao during the years immediately preceding the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In addition to being the actual founders of the CCP, these two — who were Dean of the Department of Chinese

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Letters and Librarian, respectively, at Peking University[1] — were among the few undisputed leaders of the whole Westernized intelligentsia.[2] In addition to great influence exerted through the traditional Chinese sage-disciple relationship with their students, who later staged the May Fourth Movement, their effect upon Mao Tse-tung was very great — profound in the case of Ch'en Tu-hsiu.

In the fall of 1918 Mao had taken a minor position in the library at Peking University where he met Ch'en Tu-hsiu briefly. (There were to be endless meetings later.) Although neither seems to have made any impact upon the other at their first meeting, Mao could not escape the pervading influence of the professor who almost singlehandedly had changed the intellectual atmosphere of the time.[3] No one before had addressed the Chinese students in the manner of Ch'en Tu-hsiu:

> What I want to say, and to say with tears, is that I hope those of you who are young will be self-conscious and that you will struggle. By self-consciousness I mean that you are to be conscious of the power and responsibility of your youth, and that you are to respect it. Why do I think you should struggle? Because it is necessary for you to use all the intelligence you have to get rid of those who are decaying, who have lost their youth. Regard them as enemies and beasts: do not be influenced by them, do not associate with them.
>
> O young men of China! Will you be able to understand me? Five out of every ten whom I see are young in health, but they are also old in spirit. When this happens to a body, the body is dying. When it happens to a society, the society is perishing. Such a sickness cannot be cured by sighing; it can only be cured by those who are young, and in addition to being young are courageous. We must have youth if we are to survive, we must have youth if we are to get rid of corruption. Here lies the only hope for our society.[4]

To Mao, Ch'en Tu-hsiu was a trumpet heralding for China a turning of the ways. Ch'en's was a style mingling exhortation with great hope; it was concise, brutal. This style was to have a definite impact on Mao; his famous phrase "New Democracy" derives from Ch'en. Whole phrases, originally written by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, were to be reflected or copied verbatim in Mao's books written in later years in Yenan.[5]

The relevance of Ch'en's thinking continues in the mind of Mao even today. A verbatim publication of Ch'en's statement could easily serve as a manifesto for the Great Cultural Revolution which Mao has carried out, since 1966, through the medium of the Red Guards. It is necessary only to interpret the "young" and "old" in the light of present experience; the underlying philosophy remains intact. Mao is still advocating struggle and the maintenance of a revolutionary spirit in China, lest the "old" people be beguiled by the insidious invasion of capitalism, dogmatism, and revisionism, and the "young" people be denied the utopian life their Communist ideology promises them. The rationale underlying the philosophies of Ch'en and Mao — although both their strategies and tactics were vastly different — was the same; both held as a fond dream the restoration of China to the position of power and eminence that they considered was rightfully hers.

In the years preceding 1919 Ch'en Tu-hsiu had adopted a philosophy based on the Western ideas of democracy and science. His philosophy embodied the total rejection of all traditional Chinese beliefs such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. He regarded China's impotence in the face of the humiliating incursions of the West to be the result of the passivity and stagnation engendered by the radically antiworldly bias of Buddhism and

Taoism and the initiative-destroying family and social obligations of Confucianism. He was sure he saw the answer to the threat of the West in the West itself — democracy and science.[6] It is, of course, clear that it is precisely these concepts he is addressing in his cryptic Peking University speech.[7] The "young" he refers to are those with the vision to appreciate the necessity for the Westernization of China, while the "old" are those too steeped in the traditions of China to see beyond the limitations of that culture.

Li Ta-chao was a man of fundamentally different beut from Ch'en Tu-hsiu. Whereas Ch'en Tu-hsiu concerned himself by predilection with concrete social and literary problems, Li Ta-chao's propensity was notably metaphysical. After becoming professor of history in 1920, he evolved a philosophy which was a strange amalgam of Chinese and Western concepts. Here, mixed with elements of Buddha and Ch'u Yuan are found the ideas of Emerson and Hegel. In spite of his inspirations from Emerson, however, Li contended that the individual finds his significance only in the world spirit. As professor of history, his knowledge of German philosophy, gained through studying Hegel, biased him in favor of impersonal historic forces. Thus, traditional Chinese thought and Hegel both prepared him for easy acceptance of this aspect of Marxism.[8]

Overriding Li Ta-chao's philosophic search for the truth, however, were the same considerations which motivated Ch'en Tu-hsiu — the plight of China. Essentially his philosophy was a defiant reply to the charge that China was a dead civilization with no further chance for development. He succinctly summarizes his stand in the statement that China

> . . . has gone through an extremely long history and the accumulated dust of the past is heavily weighing it down. By fettering its life, it has brought our nation to a state of extreme decay. . . . What we must prove to the world is not that the old China is not dead, but that a new youthful China is in the process of being born.[9]

The points in common between Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao were their hostility toward traditional Chinese culture and an attempt to find the solution to China's problems in the West. In spite of their differing intellectual predilections, both gravitated toward world views which offered sweeping solutions. This led from preliminary acceptance of democratic concepts ultimately to the acceptance of Marxism as the all-embracing panacea for China. The final reconciliation of the mental conflicts in the acceptance of Marxism was long and difficult for both, but the transition was made, and on 30 June 1921 they held the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Shanghai.[10] Among the delegates to this Congress was Mao Tse-tung.[11]

The Kuomintang-Communist Alliance. At the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 the consensus opinion of the Eastern delegates was that the East was on the verge of a large-scale revolutionary upheaval. The result of this feeling was a paper drafted by Lenin entitled *Theses on the National and Colonial Question* which stipulated that Communist Parties in the Eastern countries should form "temporary agreements or even alliances" with indigenous national liberation movements. Lenin did not specify the form of these agreements or alliances. He only indicated that the Communists should not merge with the nationalists but should preserve "the independent character of the proletarian movement — even in its germinal form." [12] The practical difficulties of interpreting this properly in light of Marxist dogma were later to

give Stalin many a headache, principally from Trotsky; nevertheless, the basis for an eventual Communist-Kuomintang alliance was laid.

The Kremlin desired to exploit the revolutionary climate in China for the purpose of securing its eastern flank by locking the imperialist countries out while providing a means of access for revolutionary purposes. It was clear, however, that the Kremlin had no intention of basing all its hopes in China on the impending formation of a Communist Party. Noting the weakness of the Communist movement in China in 1920 Lenin even courted the favor of Wu P'ei-fu, then the strongest warlord in North China.[13] Lenin realized that communism was completely alien to the Chinese and considered its best chance for growth in China would be by cloaking it in a mantle of nationalism under the protective cover of the Kuomintang.[14]

By the time of the Fourth Congress, the interests of the Kremlin had focused in the direction of Sun Yat-sen, "the father of Chinese nationalism." The Soviet Union needed a strong ally in Asia, and Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang looked like the best bet at that time. This approach did, of course, entail some shifting in the ideological sphere to include a new emphasis on bourgeois nationalism and the necessity of a capitalist phase of development in colonial and semicolonial areas.

The ideological problem was not limited solely to the Kremlin, however. Ch'en Tu-hsiu vigorouly opposed the Kuomintang-Communist alliance on ideological grounds. However, at a plenum of the Central Committee convened at Hangchow, Maring, a Comintern agent, compelled the plenum, under pressure of Comintern discipline, to endorse his plan for Communist Party members to enter the ranks of the Kuomintang.[15] Maring later admitted that he did not have specific authority to effect such a union of the two parties, and the Kremlin continued as late as January 1923 to speak of "coordinating the activities" of the two parties without suggesting any closer union.[16] The problem was, however, settled in January 1923 when Sun Yat-sen met with the Soviet Envoy Adolf A. Joffe and drafted a joint resolution which resolved all major issues between Moscow and the Kuomintang Government, and Sun Yat-sen set about to absorb the Communists.[17] By this time Sun had given up hope of any aid from the United States.

The weakness of the CCP played a significant part in its final decision to go along with the Kremlin's desire that it join the Kuomintang. Additionally, in a move to ameliorate the situation for the Communists, the Third Party Congress mapped out a course whereby the CCP would conquer power from the Kuomintang in the ensuing years.[18] In 1924 the CCP participated in the First National Conference of the Kuomintang, as convoked by Sun Yat-sen, on the basis of the policies: (1) alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, (2) alliance of the Kuomintang with the CCP, and (3) assistance to the peasants and workers.[19] Subsequently, Soviet aid, advice, and advisers began to flow in, and the weak, struggling Chinese Communist Party had its start.

Thus, in the face of the growing nationalism of the 20th century and in an effort to realize the aspirations of their people, a segment of the Chinese leadership was drawn inexorably to the door of communism in their search for a solution to the plight of China. Having selected communism as the means to return China to greatness, these leaders next required assistance to sustain the weak, immature Party through its difficult infancy. By allying

themselves with the Kuomintang, the Communists obtained the nurture which their fledgling Party required for its early growth.

II — MAO TSE-TUNG AND FOREIGN POLICY

Chinese communism has historically identified "feudalism" and "imperialism" as its "number one enemies." The "feudalism" opposed has been the powers of the Chinese warlords, the relationships between landlords and peasants, and traditional Chinese cultural patterns in general. The "imperialism" opposed has been the "unequal treaties" imposed upon China by foreign governments since the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and religious, educational, and philanthropic work of foreign governments in China, which Mao has termed "cultural aggression" and "invasion" aimed at "doping" the Chinese population for the benefit of Western "invaders." [1] The leaders of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance termed their coalition a national bourgeois-democratic revolution against "imperialism" and "feudalism."[2]

Foreign Policy Aims. The alliance between the Communists and the Kuomintang which Stalin had advocated, although never very stable, completely ruptured in 1927. By 1926 Chiang Kai-shek had built the Kuomintang armed forces into an effective fighting arm and had made himself its dominant figure. In late 1926 Chiang embarked upon a military expedition northward to the Yangtze in order to enlarge the area of Kuomintang power. Because of the political disunity which arose out of the Kuomintang's initial military successes, the movement split. The liberal faction of the Kuomintang proceeded up the Yangtze and established itself at the Wuhan ports, while Chiang led his faction toward Shanghai and the treaty ports with the idea of gaining control of their financial and material wealth.[3]

As Chiang's forces approached Shanghai, Communist supporters in the city, still putting their faith in the Kuomintang as directed by Moscow, rose up against the anti-Kuomintang authorities. Chiang paused at the gates of Shanghai, and only after the fighting had subsided, with the Communists victorious and the anti-Kuomintang forces effectively destroyed, did Chiang enter the city, on Communist invitation, with his fresh troops. He thereupon fell upon his exhausted Communist allies, slaughtered them unmercifully, and emerged in undisputed control of the situation.[4]

Although this was a severe blow to Stalin's China policy, Stalin continued to believe, for reasons of his own, that the Kuomintang could still be used as an instrument of Soviet policy. Stalin, therefore, advocated that the Communists continue to adopt the same subservience to the more liberal wing of the Kuomintang, centered in the Wuhan ports, that they had previously been required to adopt toward Chiang. The liberal wing, however, had fallen increasingly under the influence of its own non-Communist and anti-Communist generals, who proceeded somewhat less dramatically but equally as effectively to eliminate their Communist allies, thus completing the disaster. The Chinese Communist Party was decimated and forced to go underground.[5]

Mao rescued a contingent of the underground remnants of the Party and led them away to the rugged border area of Kiangsi Province where he established a base camp among the peasants. It was there that Mao decided to base the Chinese revolution on the peasants instead of on the proletariat as required by classical Marxism and advocated by Stalin. How Mao evalu-

ated Stalin's failures in China is problematical, but it seems certain that Mao decided at this juncture that the only way the Chinese revolution could survive as a viable force was on the strength of its own decisions. These decisions would be tailored to the unique situation in China as Mao saw it, not based unquestioningly on dictates from Moscow. Mao continued to pay lipservice to his political affinity with Moscow and to pay Moscow that outward deference required of all foreign Communist Parties, but things were never the same after 1927. Mao's caution was to limit the extent of CCP submission to the authority of Moscow, and Mao was always careful to reserve sufficient independence for China to prevent its ever becoming a Soviet satellite.[6]

The CCP continued to concern itself with foreign affairs after the dissolution of the Communist-Kuomintang alliance. In November 1931 the Communists established the Provisional Soviet Government of China. They incorporated their foreign policy aims in the platform of their Government.[7]

> The immediate abrogation of all unequal treaties concluded between the imperialist countries and the landlord-bourgeoisie [sic] governments of China, the repudiation of all foreign debts contracted by the ruling class of China for the suppression of the mass movement and massacre of the masses, the unconditional rendition of all foreign settlements, concessions and leased territories now under control of the imperialists, the immediate withdrawal of all imperialist land, air and naval forces from Chinese soil, [and,] last but most important of all, the confiscation of all imperialist banks, factories, mines and communication-transportation enterprises located in China as the most effective measure to destroy the imperialist domination, root and branch. Furthermore, the Provisional Government of the Soviet Republic of China declares that it will, on no condition, remain content with the overthrow of imperialism in China but, on the contrary, will aid as its ultimate objective in waging a war against world imperialism until the latter is all blown up.[8]

This vitriolic, xenophobic pronouncement shows the concepts of Chinese Communist foreign policy taking form. Although it is couched in the Communist ideological vernacular, the outraged cry of frustrated and humiliated nationalism, smarting under nearly 100 years of Western imperialistic oppression, is clearly discernible. It might, at first glance, appear to be just a wild lashing out at the enemies of Chinese communism, but on closer inspection it seems to be a rather carefully conceived plan, and for an embryonic power its compass is rather startling. It reminds one of Napoleon's warning, given over 150 years ago, that China was a sleeping dragon that had best be left to slumber lest it destroy those who awaken it.[9]

The United Front. The Communists continued to expand the Chinese Soviet areas in Kiangsi and the contiguous provinces of south-central China. At one time, Communist control extended over nearly 300,000 square miles of mountainous and rural areas.[10] Although Chiang Kai-shek's National Government was under considerable strain from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Chiang continued to wage a ruthless war of extermination against the Communists. This took the form of five annihilation campaigns which culminated in the epic "Long March" of 1934-35.[11]

Of the over 100,000 Communists who broke out of the Nationalist encirclement in October 1934, probably less than 20,000 of them reached Shensi Province in the latter part of 1935 after marching and fighting along a circuitous route of some 6,000 miles.

At the end of 1936 the Chinese Communist headquarters was established at Yenan in Shensi Province.[12]

In his fervor completely to eradicate the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek went to northwest China in December 1936 to help speed up the campaign. Chiang was kidnapped in Sian by refugee Manchurian troops who chafed to fight Japanese invaders, not Chinese rebels. Chiang was presented an ultimatum to form a Kuomintang-Communist united front to fight the Japanese. This had been the line, advocated by both the Comintern and the CCP since August 1935, to which Chiang had turned a deaf ear. The Kremlin and the CCP considered that a united Chinese resistance to the Japanese would serve the dual purpose of diverting Japan from attacking Russia and Nanking from attacking the CCP.[13]

However, Chiang refused the demands of his captors. The Communists were ready to kill him when they received peremptory orders from the Comintern to release him. The Comintern knew that Chiang Kai-shek's rival in the Nationalist Party, Wang Ching-wei, was on his way to Shanghai from Germany with Hitler's blessing. Since Wang Ching-wei was strongly influenced by Germany, the Comintern realized that if he came to power he would probably join China with the anti-Comintern powers, Germany and Japan, to crush the Communists. This would have laid bare to Japanese pressures the whole Russian border with China from the Yellow Sea to Turkestan. The irony of the situation was that, in order to save the Chinese Communists, the Kremlin had to save Chiang Kai-shek.[14]

The subsequent unleashing of the Japanese attack near Peking on 7 July 1937 forced the Nanking Government to turn to resist them. This virtually eliminated further hostilities against the Communists, who were thus saved by Japan from certain extermination at the hands of the Government. This increasing pressure from the Japanese led shortly thereafter to the second Kuomintang-Communist "marriage of convenience" — the new "united front."[15]

Postwar Strategy. The Chinese "united front" relationship continued always in perilous balance with clashes occurring throughout the course of World War II. The critical test, however, was to come with victory over the external enemy. The race for political position was well underway during wartime but naturally accelerated after the Japanese surrendered. Before the war ended — during April-June 1945 — the CCP held its Seventh Congress and perfected its strategy for the postwar period by adopting the flexible line of "coalition government."[16] The political moves of the protagonists are amply recorded in the State Department's "White Paper on China."[17]

CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung enunciated the Chinese Communist position in his political report, "On Coalition Government," delivered at the Seventh Congress of the CCP on 24 April 1945, when he hinted at a possible resumption of civil war after victory over Japan. He stated:

> It must be understood that, however tortuous the route may be, the Chinese people will fulfill their tasks of achieving independence and liberation and the time for them to do so has already arrived. The great aspirations of countless martyrs of the past hundred-odd years must be fulfilled by our generation; whoever attempts to deter us will certainly fail in the end.[18]

In this statement Mao appears to be firmly convinced that his cause will prevail, although he senses that it will be an arduous ordeal. Mao reveals a feeling that it is his destiny to lead the

Chinese people back to a position of pre-eminence in the world, and with the impending victory over the external enemy, he is eager to get on with the task.

Mao Tse-tung turns next to foreign relations in his report to the Seventh Congress. Aware of the policies of Britain and the United States, he offers them evidence of his determination and makes a subtle appeal for a reevaluation on their part. It is a matter of interesting conjecture to try to envisage the paths along which Chinese communism might have developed if the United States had chosen to recognize Mao, sometime after World War II, as the representative voice of the Chinese people rather than Chiang Kai-shek. Mao further states on 24 April 1945:

> The basic principle underlying the foreign policy of the Chinese Communist Party consists in establishing and developing diplomatic relations with all countries and in solving all problems of mutual concern, such as military co-ordination, peace conferences, international trade and foreign investments - - all these on the basis of complete defeat of the Japanese aggressors, maintenance of world peace, mutual respect of national independence, mutual treatment as equals and mutual help in promoting national and popular interests and in advancing the friendship between nations and peoples.
>
> We request all Allied governments, first of all the governments of Britain and the United States, to pay serious attention to the voice of the great majority of the Chinese people and take care that their foreign policy does not run counter to the wishes of the Chinese people and impair the friendship between the Chinese people and themselves. We believe that a foreign government will commit a grievous error if it supports the Chinese reactionaries and opposes the democratic cause of the Chinese people.[19]

American Mediation. In the latter part of 1943 American diplomats became concerned with the possibility of a future civil war in China. Their concern over the Kuomintang-Communist rivalry was that the war effort might possibly be hamstrung and that the Russians would eventually back the Communists. The United States hoped to avert an eventual civil war by encouraging a political settlement and by strengthening the Nationalist Government through a program of building up its armies and calling for reforms. In spite of U.S. efforts throughout the remainder of the war, with peace came the long foreseen civil war in the form of rivalry over the occupied areas.[20]

The United States had no intention of attempting to resolve the China crisis by fighting another war in East Asia on the heels of World War II. Diplomatic measures, however, were continued, but the prospects for a peaceful settlement looked poor. General Wedemeyer concluded in his 20 November 1945 report, "It appears remote that a satisfactory understanding will be reached between Chinese Communists and the National Government." [21]

President Truman appointed Gen. George C. Marshall as his Special Representative in China on 27 November 1945. The general was charged in his letter of instructions "to bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States" to the end "that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible and concurrently to endeavor to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China." [22]

Both parties to the dispute accepted General Marshall's good offices and on 10 January 1946 reached an agreement for the cessation of hostilities. The breakdown in relations in July 1946, however, belied the promise of deep-seated dedication to peaceful relations

between the two sides. The mediator was attacked from both sides with the Kuomintang in favor of settlement of the issue by force and against "American intervention," whereas the CCP launched a bitter attack against American policy in China and American military and economic aid to the National Government which allegedly encouraged the Kuomintang's civil war policy.[23]

Statement Against America. The Communists continued to concentrate their attention, in foreign affairs, on the United States. In a memorandum, "Explanation of Several Basic Questions Concerning the Post-War International Situation," published on 5 January 1947 at Yenan, Chief of the CCP Department of Information, Lu Ting-yi, referred to Mao Tse-tung's speech of April 1945 and said in part:

> After World War II, American imperialists took the place of Fascist Germany, Italy and Japan, becoming a fortress of the world reactionary forces. . . . The reactionaries of all countries and the Fascist remnants have now all become traitors directly or indirectly supported and protected by the American imperialists selling out the people of all countries . . ..
>
> Standing against the world reactionaries — the imperialists of America and their running dogs in various countries — is the world democratic might . . ..
>
> This world-wide united front cannot possibly be of any other character than that of a united front hunting for world peace and democracy and independence of all nations against the American imperialism and its running dogs in various countries. This united front will undoubtedly have the sympathy and moral support of the socialist Soviet Union . . ..
>
> In general, everything has changed after the Second World War, and is still continuing to change. How strong the people have become — how conscious, how organized, determined, and full of confidence! How maniacally savage the reactionaries have become — outwardly strong yet inwardly feeble, turned against by masses and deserted by their allies, devoid of all confidence in their future! It may be forecast categorically that the face of China and the world will be vastly different after three to five more years. All comrades of our party and all people of China must resolutely fight for a new China and a new world.[24]

Any idea that the Chinese Communists might have entertained about the United States possibly finding some sympathy for their cause, either before or subsequent to the end of World War II, was abandoned in July 1946 when they resumed hostilities with the Chinese Nationalists. Lu Ting-yi's memorandum spells out the Chinese Communists' conception of the world situation at the beginning of 1947 and rings of bitterness and disappointment at the U.S. decision to continue its support of the Nationalists. It indicates their intention henceforth to consider the United States their number one enemy in a determined drive to change the face of China and the world. It contained a plea for the Soviets — who still maintained diplomatic relations with the Nationalists — to join unequivocally in their struggle.

Lean to one Side. As predicted by General Wedemeyer the Nationalists lost Manchuria in 1948, and in 1949 they lost all China. On 1 October 1949 a new "coalition" government was established at Peking under the firm control of the CCP. The position of this government and the course it was to follow was clearly spelled out in Mao Tse-tung's 30 June 1949 article, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship."

Mao wrote "On People's Democratic Dictatorship" to commemorate the 28th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. In it he called on the working class and the Communists to work hard and create conditions for the natural elimination of classes, state authority,

and political parties, "so that mankind will enter the realm of world Communism." Up to that time, he said, the "principal and fundamental experience" gained by the Chinese people had taught them to:

> . . . unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an international united front.[25]

He indicated this meant "leaning to one side":

> The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years' experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side. In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.[26]

Mao acknowledged his willingness to do business and establish diplomatic relations with all foreign countries, and he admitted that victory was not possible without international help. He denied, however, that aid was required from Britain and the United States:

> Would the present rulers of Britain and the United States, who are imperialists, help a people's state? . . . Throughout his life, Sun Yat-sen appealed countless times to the capitalist countries for help and got nothing but heartless rebuffs . . .. Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, not to the side of the imperialist front.[27]

Thus Mao clearly indicated that, for the moment at least, Peking had molded its foreign policy to fit the needs of international communism as directed by Moscow. Although having long ago decided on communism (Mao's version, at least) as the salvation for China, Mao did not envision his role in alignment with the U.S.S.R. as anything similar to the gallant warrior delivering up the prize of conquest to his king. Although identification with the birthplace of Communist power and authority was necessary for ideological reasons, it also fit neatly into the nationalistic requirement for power which required economic and military assistance and the enhancement of Mao's prestige — both necessary to Mao's dream of the restoration of China to its rightful place of preeminence in the world.

III — THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

Chinese-Russian relations have a history of controversy as far back as the intermittent border war over the Amur River valley which began in the 1650's. Tsarist Russia obtained substantial areas of Chinese territory with the Treaty of Aigun in 1858, the Treaty of Peking in 1860, and the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1881. Furthermore, the Russian Communists, after coming to power, did not forego a policy of aggrandizement at China's expense. In 1929 they fought a war over control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in Manchuria. They also violated the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 by detaching Outer Mongolia from China and establishing a Russian protectorate over the area.[1] Even after the Chinese Communists came to power, Stalin continued to follow Russian historical precedent and viewed China more with avarice and fear than with fraternal goodwill.

Sino-Soviet Alliance. The mistakes Stalin had made in China at the expense of the Chinese Communists by no means ended with the termination of World War II. The small faith Stalin had in the CCP and the ever-present problem of protection of his eastern flank manifested themselves again after the cessation of hostilities. By advising Mao against a premature attempt to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek immediately after World War II, Stalin gave Mao ample reason to suspect the Kremlin was more interested in dividing the imperialists than in the risk of supporting a Chinese Communist seizure of power.[2] Evidence of Stalin's caution in China in the early postwar years is contained in a Yugoslav account of his statement in February 1948 to a group of Yugoslav leaders. He is quoted as having said:

> It is true we also have made mistakes. For instance, after the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospects, that the Chinese comrades should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, and that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army.[3]

Not only had Stalin been incorrect in his assessment of the chances for success of the Chinese Communists at the end of World War II, but the ensuing armed conflict left Stalin little choice but to support it, since failure to support "the first genuinely self-propelled Socialist Revolution since 1917 could have seriously compromised Soviet leadership of the communist movement." [4] Since Mao had indicated in June 1949 his intention to "lean to one side," his establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949 was quickly followed by Russian recognition on 2 October.

Sino-Soviet relations were expanded in February 1950 with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. From the 9 weeks that Mao spent in Moscow in secret negotiation with Stalin before the Treaty was concluded, it can reasonably be assumed that the bargaining was tough on both sides. The Treaty called for common action to prevent aggression by "Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan directly or indirectly." Thus, the mutual assistance portion of the Treaty was clearly directed against their common enemy, the United States.[5]

In the economic and financial assistance field Russia contracted to advance $60 million credit per year for 5 years to finance 50 specific projects. In exchange for this commitment Stalin obtained joint Sino-Soviet stock companies for development of oil and nonferrous metal, joint management of the Changchun Railway, and the use of the naval base at Port Arthur.[6] To the Chinese the Soviet assistance for industrial development must have seemed quite niggardly, since it provided for only a very limited program. However, it seems reasonable to assume that Stalin was in no hurry to help Mao achieve his aspiration of rapid industrial development. Thus, what ostensibly might have seemed to be two fraternal Communist leaders entering into an agreement on the basis of a common ideology emerged as a haggling between two distrusting heads of state conducted with all the nationalistic zeal of a couple of capitalistic imperialists.

Throughout the remainder of Stalin's life he relegated Mao to the status of a junior partner; a role not, however, incompatible with Mao's dynastic concept of how the world should be ordered. To Mao there should only be one supreme authority, and at that time

it was Stalin. Mao was content to hide his time, learn, and do whatever possible to increase his stature in the eyes of the world. The Chinese limited victory in halting the advance of U.N. troops in Korea enhanced the prestige of Mao's government throughout Asia.[7] With the passing of Stalin the new Soviet leaders restored Port Arthur, returned control of the joint stock companies, and advanced support for construction of 141 major projects. On the political scene the new Soviet leaders demonstrated the compatibility of the two countries by showing increased respect for Mao's ideological stature and acknowledged the increased status of China within the partnership.[8]

Thus the Sino-Soviet romance rolled along in the 1950's fairly smoothly, interrupted only by such minor things as the Soviets providing military supplies for the Korean war on credit terms rather than as grants and a Russian attempt to form a joint company to exploit resources in Sinkiang, which the Chinese branded in 1954 as "Soviet economic imperialism."[9] But nothing arose which seemed to be completely insurmountable.

The Winds of Change. The year 1956 is an extremely important one in Sino-Soviet relations. It is the year in which Mao decided to modify the relationship of Peking vis-a-vis Moscow and interject Chinese influence into the international arena. The events of 1956 not only made it a propitious time for Peking to expand its operations to the international level, but the course that events were taking made it a necessity in Mao's eyes.

In February 1956 Khrushchev delivered two major speeches at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the first of these, which was a public statement, he attempted to lay down a new line for international communism. He modified Lenin's views on peaceful coexistence from a tactic to a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy. He further reversed Lenin's stand on the inevitability of war between communism and capitalism and stated that wars were no longer "fatalistically inevitable." He expressed the view that important opportunities existed for the conquest of power through utilization of the democratic and parliamentary institutions of some countries. He expressed the belief that a Communist victory could be achieved through peaceful competition in which the superiority of the Soviet system would be established by economic, scientific, and social achievements.[10]

For someone with no reputation as a Communist theorist, the sweeping changes advocated by Khrushchev were, indeed, quite surprising. They were apparently motivated by a realization of the disaster which thermonuclear war would bring to the Soviet Union. This was substantiated when Khrushchev expressed confidence that communism would win the peaceful competition between the two contending economic systems and declared that, "there are only two ways; either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history."[11]

This first speech was offensive to the Chinese because they interpreted Khrushchev's newly proclaimed doctrine as an attempt by Khrushchev to continue Stalin's monopoly leadership of the Communist movement. Although the Chinese had not to this point voiced a claim to leadership of the Communist movement, they considered Khrushchev to be only an interim, unqualified occupant of that position. Additionally, the Chinese considered Mao Tse-tung to be the senior living Marxist-Leninist theoretician and did not look favorably on such statements by Khrushchev.[12]

The second, "secret," speech delivered by Khrushchev, in which he denounced Stalin as a tyrant and murderer, was also looked on with disfavor by the Chinese. Mao Tse-tung's role in China bore striking similarities to Stalin's former role in Russia; consequently, Mao had a special reason for not liking Khrushchev's attack on Stalin and his "cult of personality." [13] Khrushchev's revelation of the abuses under Stalin also implicitly raised the question of whether such abuses might not be taking place in China under Mao's very similar type of rule.

Khrushchev's "secret" speech was the vehicle chosen to address a knotty problem which had confronted the Soviets since the death of Stalin: how to establish a more elastic pattern of intrabloc relations that would permit greater variation within the domestic affairs of individual nations and yet maintain overall unity of the international movement under the leadership of the Russians.[14] This speech set in motion a sequence of events which elicited Chinese responses that clearly indicated the changing posture of Peking and were very revealing of the underlying motivation of Mao.

To understand the actions taken by Mao subsequent to the 20th Congress, it is necessary to understand the "Middle Kingdom" concept from Chinese dynastic history and Mao's fascination with this concept. Mao's hopes for the future of China seem to follow a pattern which is compatible with the reestablishment of something similar to a "Middle Kingdom," ruled over by an elite governing hierarchy, at whose apex sits an omniscient ruler.[15] It is readily seen that a Communist Party with a dictator at its head neatly provides the hierarchical governing body requisite for this scheme. Under this scheme of government, all countries lying outside the "Middle Kingdom" exercise a measure of autonomy but pay homage to the seat of power and authority. This may take the form of tribute or, at a minimum, obeisance to the throne. A measure of autonomy by outlying countries is accepted and expected as long as the superior culture of the "Middle Kingdom" is acknowledged. Heresy consists only in attempting independent and egalitarian political action.[16] It is a concept based on extreme ethnocentrism.

The polycentric pressures unleashed by Khrushchev's speech caused the Chinese considerable concern when countries started calling for full autonomy. Togliatti, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, called for "full autonomy of the individual Communist Parties and of bilateral relations between them." [17] The Chinese sought to strike a balance by supporting the claims of the individual Communist states for greater independence while retaining their acceptance of Russia as the logical leader of the international Communist movement. The Chinese advocated less interference from Moscow in internal policy matters but insisted that the Soviets be acknowledged as the leader in policy matters of international importance.[18] Mao's world view permitted autonomy in domestic affairs but did not permit of total political independence. At this point in time, Mao was still willing to accept Khrushchev's right to sit on the throne of world communism, but this acquiescence probably stemmed more from Mao's overriding concern that there remain only one source of international political authority than a belief in Khrushchev's qualifications to occupy that position.[19]

The line the Chinese were following became apparent during the revolts of the fall of 1956. In Poland there was no desire to break away from the bloc — quite the opposite — they welcomed

alliance with the Soviets as a guarantee against a revitalized Germany and to maintain the Oder-Neisse line.[20] The Polish revolt was centered within the country's national Communist Party, and the control of the armed forces remained vested in the Party. Since there was no intent of Polish defection to the West, the Chinese supported Gomulka and were responsible for restraining Khrushchev from intervening with direct Soviet military action.[21]

By advocating the middle road, China gained a reputation for liberalism within the bloc. China's stand furnished the required support for Poland's dispute with Moscow over the Poles' independent road for building socialism. At the same time, the Chinese rigorously condemned as revisionism Tito's road to socialism in which he attempted to adopt a position of neutrality between the two world blocs.[22] Tito's stand would have placed Yugoslavia outside the hegemony of Moscow and was therefore heresy.

The Hungarian uprising involved a completely different set of circumstances. Counterrevolutionary forces were demanding international neutrality with the installation of a multiparty democracy. The Hungarian Communist Party had lost control of the army and it was readily apparent that, without restraint, Hungary would defect to the West, thereby fracturing socialist bloc unity. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, the Chinese pressed for direct intervention by Russian military forces.[23]

With this background of exerting international influence in Moscow's backyard, Premier Chou En-lai undertook a mission to weld the bloc nations together under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Throughout his tour of the Communist countries he stressed the need for unity as the most powerful guarantee of peace. He emphasized that without unity the countries in the socialist camp would be picked off one at a time.[24]

Chinese intervention in bloc affairs had important implications for future Sino-Soviet relations. The formula offered by the Chinese for relations within the bloc elevated Mao's prestige throughout the socialist camp and indicated a position of ideological ascendancy without impairing unity with the Soviets.[25] Also, it was instrumental in maintaining a world order in consonance with Mao's conception of a proper structure for the future. It is worthwhile noting that in addition to Mao's apparent aspiration eventually to occupy the throne of world communism, he was particularly concerned that the Communist empire remain intact until this feat was accomplished.

The Dragon Rears Its Head. Between June and November 1957 Chinese Communist domestic and foreign policy underwent a radical transformation from right to left. From their liberal position of defending Gomulka and advocating a confederative approach to bloc unity, the Chinese Communists turned by November to a position of vigorously opposing right-wing "revisionism" and advocating a strict centralist approach to bloc unity. They scrapped their conservative domestic program which was modeled after the Soviets and substituted the beginnings of a distinctively Chinese one, based on ideological as well as material incentives and on the intense application of labor more than of capital to industry. On the foreign policy front there was an abrupt shift away from the cautious, consolidating, Bandung-spirit, rightist strategy.[26]

It would appear that in May 1957 Mao fell victim to his own ideas and illusions. For years he had carefully fostered the idea that the Communist Party represented the broad interests of the Chinese masses and that it was a genuinely popular party. Mao believed

he could avoid Stalin's mistakes by being a benevolent dictator and thereby lessen the conflict between ruler and the ruled.[27] Laboring under this swollen impression of himself, he instituted the period of a "hundred flowers." This was Mao's phrase for a period of "blooming and contending" in which the Communist rulers invited their subjects to criticize the regime. This period was called to a halt in June, after just 6 weeks of operation, when the situation began to get out of hand. Mao Tse-tung and communism in general were both being attacked bitterly.[28] Evidently, instead of "blooming and contending" the peasants were getting pretty "blooming contentious."

In addition to the traumatic experience of the "hundred flowers" campaign, the Chinese Communist leadership was faced with a domestic economic crisis in the summer of 1957. Serious food shortages had arisen as a result of the failure of collectivization to produce the expected agricultural expansion. And not much assistance was expected from the Soviet Union in resolving the economic dilemma. Clearly, drastic action was required.[29]

Up to the time of the "hundred flowers" campaign the rightist elements of the Party exerted the principal influence on Mao. It appears reasonable that the left wing of the Party used the failure of the "hundred flowers" experiment to convince Mao of the error of the rightists' domestic policy. This, coupled with an urgency for action in the face of an economic crisis with no outside help in sight, seems a plausible explanation for the left ascendancy in the summer and fall of 1957 and the adoption of their economic development program based on ideological fervor.[30]

Although the left-right struggle seems to have been primarily over domestic economic policy, an intimate connection between solutions for domestic and foreign problems seems likely in view of the world outlook of the Chinese left. While not implying a direct relationship between Communist domestic and external policies under all conditions, internal convulsions accompanied by factional disputes are likely to be reflected in the foreign policy arena.[31] It also seems to fit the pattern to assume that the left convinced Mao that, in view of Russian policy since the 20th Congress and in view of Mao's increasing ideological prestige, the time was ripe for Mao to attempt a stronger influence on the direction international Communist policy was to take.

Thus, by late 1957 the CCP was no longer championing the cause of the East European autonomists as they had in 1956 and early 1957. In November 1957 the Chinese abruptly deserted Gomulka and startled the Communist world by asserting the need for unqualified loyalty to Soviet leadership. This policy was soon to open up a new dialogue between Moscow and Peking.[32]

In line with their new tough policy in foreign relations, the Chinese in the fall of 1957 hailed the Soviet advances in intercontinental ballistic missiles and the launching of the Soviet Sputnik as proof that communism was now stronger than capitalism. Mao stated:

> I am of the opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today; the East wind and the West wind . . .. I think the characteristic of the situation today is the East wind prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the socialist forces are overwhelmingly superior to the imperialistic forces.[33]

Although Peking appeared to disregard the dangers of nuclear war with the West and continued to press the Soviets to take greater risks, Khrushchev held to his peaceful coexistence

theme expounded at the 20th Congress. He rebuked Mao by stating, "only an unreasonable person can be fearless of war in our days."[34] However, the Chinese induced the Russians in October 1957 to agree to help them become a nuclear power and even to promise to give them a nuclear bomb. The Chinese Communists revealed this agreement in August 1963.[35] It seems plausible that this Russian offer may have been made in exchange for silencing Chinese opposition to Moscow's foreign policy line. Subsequently the Chinese publicly praised the Russians and hailed them as the leaders of communism. The following year, however, difficulties arose in implementing the agreement. The Russians apparently proposed that they retain control over Chinese nuclear weapons. Peking viewed this as a Soviet attempt to gain military mastery over China.[36]

Although Sino-Soviet differences were marked in 1958, the Chinese apparently still felt there was some chance of influencing the Soviets to take a tougher stand in foreign relations. It seems plausible that the Taiwan incident was an attempt to force the Soviet hand. Chinese Communist propagandists started a campaign on the theme of "liberating" Taiwan. This brought the speedy arrival of Khrushchev in Peking on 31 July.[37] Khrushchev's trip ended the hopes for a Taiwan "liberation" and apparently also any further Chinese hopes of influencing the Soviets to accept their foreign policy line.

It would appear that henceforth the Chinese Communist preoccupation would be with wresting leadership control of the international Communist movement from the Soviets. Finding himself unable satisfactorily to influence the course of the international movement with Khrushchev on the throne, Mao decided the time had come to depose him and assert his rightful claim. To add to the authenticity of his claim to leadership of the movement, it seems likely that Mao thought he had the makings of a spectacular. This was the commune program he had clandestinely undertaken and which the Russians only learned of in 1958 after it was well underway.[38]

That Mao had finally decided to make his bid for leadership of the Communist movement seems to be borne out in the Chinese assertion that, with the advent of the communes, the shortcut to Communism was a reality, and the achievement of this goal was not too distant a prospect.[39] This Chinese claim of preparing to cross the threshold into communism ahead of the Soviets was ideologically significant for the underdeveloped countries of the world. In all the ramifications of the Sino-Soviet conflict as it widens and deepens, the thing that remains constant is the Chinese thrust for leadership of the international Communist movement.

IV — CHINESE BORDER INVOLVEMENTS

The bill that Mao would present to the world, in terms of territorial claims requisite to the reestablishment of Chinese preeminence in Asia, was foreseen in 1939 when he said:

> After having inflicted military defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China as well as part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyus, the Peseadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; and even a miserable little country like Portugual took Macao from us.[1]

Although Mao's ideological orientation was vastly different from Sun Yat-sen's, his nationalistic aspiration of restoring China's position in the world was the

same. Sun Yat-sen had earlier decried China's loss of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Burma, Annam, the Amur and Assuri River Basins, and the areas of the Ili, Khokand, and Amur Rivers, as well as such tributary areas as the Ryukyus, Thailand, Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago, Java, Ceylon, Nepal, and Bhutan.[2] Thus, regaining China's lost territory was no less important to Mao because of ideological convictions than it had been to the "father of Chinese nationalism," Sun Yat-sen.

The Beginnings of Empire. When the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on 1 October 1949, its announced intention in foreign relations was to protect China's independence, freedom, and integrity. Although this intention could be interpreted to mean the extension of the government's authority over parts of China still under Nationalist control, later Communist actions showed that the Communists were thinking particularly of Tibet, of certain border areas controlled by India and Burma, and possibly also Korea and Mongolia.[3] It seems probable that the absorption of Southeast Asia was intended to be achieved by strengthening and influencing indigenous Communist movements, supporting indirect aggression in neighboring areas, and, where necessary, using the forces of the People's Liberation Army in limited actions.[4] China's national interests of maintaining its national security and expanding its power and influence into adjacent areas could thus be achieved.

After coming to power the Chinese Communists wasted little time in implementing their plan to consolidate their gains and initiate the reestablishment of the Chinese Empire. In rapid succession, they solicited collaboration with Tibetan revolutionaries in January 1950; concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid with Russia in February 1950; and instituted large-scale immigration into Sinkiang in March 1950.

Early in 1950 a group of East Tibetan leaders was planning and directing a revolt against the Lhasa Government. Peking sent a letter to these leaders requesting that they collaborate with China in the revolt and further stating that China intended to take over the whole of Tibet, and after that Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan.[5] On October 1950 Peking announced that "the process of liberating Tibet had begun and it was determined to do this by peaceful means."[6]

Actually on 7 October 1950, without warning, 40,000 troops of the 18th and 62nd Chinese Communist Armies crossed into Tibet at three points and overwhelmed the meager and ill-prepared Tibetan Border Forces. By 25 October, the date of their official announcement that the liberation had begun, the major job of occupying Tibet was already accomplished.[7] Tibet asked the United Nations and India for assistance. The United Nations was too involved with the Korean war to pay proper attention, and India announced that their government did, in fact, recognize China's suzerainty over Tibet, thus withdrawing from any responsibility there.[8]

Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China the Soviets had maintained some influence in Sinkiang through the medium of the Soviet-inspired "East Turkestan Republic."[9] Russia was interested in developing and exploiting the petroleum and mineral resources to be found in Sinkiang. With the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid, the Soviets refrained from any further interference in Sinkiang.[10] However, subsequent agreements did allow the remnants of Russian author-

ity to linger in Sinkiang in the form of joint stock companies to exploit oil and nonferrous metals in which capital, direction, and profits were to be shared for 30 years. In spite of this obvious Soviet influence, China was in need of the assistance that the Russians were able to extend. In an effort to counter Russian prestige and consolidate the Chinese Communist position in Sinkiang, the Chinese began large-scale immigration into the area in March 1950.[11]

Subsequent to the actions taken by the Chinese Communists in 1950 to obtain aid from the Russians and extend their control over Tibet and Sinkiang, their plans of empire were interrupted by the Korean war. Although Chou En-lai stated as early as 1940 that Sino-Korean relations would be of great importance in the future,[12] it seems most probable that the introduction of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean war was simply a nationalistic response to what appeared to be a threat to the Manchurian border. Although Korea was included in Mao's list of tributary countries appropriated by Japan, there seems to be no evidence that China planned, at the time of the Korean war, to bring Korea once again under its hegemony. Additionally, since China was attempting to spread its influence within the ideological constraints of Communist doctrine, it was not compatible with this ideology to press Korea too hard at that time. As for the argument that China was simply coming to the aid of another Communist Party on ideological grounds, that seems too generous in view of subsequent experience.

After the Korean war China reasserted her claim to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. In 1954 shellings were conducted against the islands of Matsu and Quemoy, but any anticipated invasion was thwarted by the Chinese Nationalists who were supported by the U.S. 7th Fleet. Following this half-hearted attempt to extend their control over Taiwan, the Chinese Communists decided to present a peace-loving image to the world.

At New Delhi, on 2 April 1954, representatives of the Governments of the People's Republic of China and India signed an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. The agreement set up trade agencies by the Chinese in Calcutta, New Delhi, and Kalimpong. It established trade agencies for the Indians in the Tibetan towns of Yatung, Gyangtse, and Garlok. In effect, by referring to the Tibet Region of China, India officially recognized Chinese sovereignty, not suzerainty, over Tibet.[13]

There were five principles, which became known as Panch Shila, enumerated in the preamble to the trade agreement:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual nonaggression,
3. Mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and
5. Peaceful coexistence.

Panch Shila (peaceful coexistence) became the principle of Indian foreign policy toward China.[14]

Between 18 and 24 April 1955, 29 African and Asian nations met at Bandung, Indonesia. At this conference Chou En-lai told all the nations present that China did not desire to spread its ideology but, rather, it sought normal relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence as agreed to by China and India.[15] China evidently decided on this ploy to gain time in consolidating her position in areas already under Chinese control, to concentrate needed attention on domestic problems, and to plan the next phase of expansion.

China's Southern Border. In 1957 Mao Tse-tung expressed his belief that China's historical relationship to its past empire would be restored.[16] By this time Mao was thoroughly disillusioned with Khrushchev's leadership of the international Communist movement and was in the process of building up his power position in Asia in order to challenge Khrushchev for the leadership role. This bid was to take the form in Asia of securing China's southern border areas and humiliating India, thereby removing her as a voice of authority in Asia. Actions taken by China in response to events in Tibet were eventually to involve China in a confrontation with India.

A widespread revolt of Tibetan Kham tribesmen, which broke out in late 1955, threatened the security of Chinese communications with Tibet. The main components of this communication system were two roads traversing difficult terrain between China and Lhasa, the Tibetan capital. These long roads ran through Kham-populated territory and were subject to the hazards of guerrila warfare. Peking decided to build a more secure and reliable road through the high plain of Aksai Chin which linked western Tibet with Sinkiang. This area was relatively uninhabited, and the threat of rebel activity was not likely. The road could also be used the year around. The only problem was that the road was to be built through territory that India claimed. The Chinese apparently decided the requirement for the road was great enough to risk a break with India. Peking undoubtedly assumed that, as in the Tibetan case earlier, India would reluctantly accept the road in order to avoid straining Sino-Indian peaceful coexistence.[17]

Chinese parties surveyed the route in 1956, and Peking announced completion of the road on 5 October 1957. The Indian Government knew nothing of the road construction until a picture of it appeared in a Chinese pictorial magazine. They then sent reconnaissance parties to the area to ascertain if the road was in Indian territory. When, in 1958, it was determined that the road ran across Indian territory, a note protesting infringement of Indian territory was sent to Peking.[18] This was followed by bitter exchanges from both sides.

In early 1959 the Dalai Lama fled to India to escape the Red Chinese who were ruthlessly suppressing the Tibetan revolt. Peking accused the Indian Government of supporting the Tibetan rebellion from the Indian border town of Kalimpong, which, according to the Chinese, was the commanding center of the revolt.[19] By March 1959 the Tibetan revolt was under control, and Peking turned her full attention to India. China directed a violent propaganda war against India, using the Tibetan revolt, suspected Indian and American support, and the border dispute as the reasons for her attack.[20] Mao Tse-tung termed the Indians "reactionary, imperialists, and aggressive."[21]

During the time New Delhi and Peking were involved over the dispute of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh, the Chinese made other significant statements concerning India and border encroachments upon Indian territory. Chinese officers in Tibet stated "that they would before long liberate Sikkim, Bhutan, Ladakh, and the Northeast Frontier Area (NEFA), which was wrongfully held by Indian imperialists."[22] Border areas were saturated with propaganda and the people told "that if Tibet was the palm of China's hand, Bhutan, NEFA, Sikkim, Nepal, and Ladakh were its fingers."[23]

After border clashes in October 1959, which almost brought Sino-Indian re-

lations to the breaking point, the Chinese changed their tactics and pursued a course designed to isolate India diplomatically from her Asian neighbors. China started negotiations with Burma, Pakistan, and Nepal over her longstanding border disputes with these countries. Nepal signed a border agreement with China in 1960. Pakistan did not conclude her agreement with China over the border of northwestern Kashmir until May 1962. The Sino-Burmese Border Treaty was signed in January 1961. The almost total isolation of India was completed, in her own border quarrels, by adroit use of diplomatic pressure.[24]

After the breaking point in relations was reached in October 1959, the Chinese made an effort to stem the flood of Indian charges against China and to convince the world that China wanted a peaceful settlement of the border dispute. On 7 September 1959 Chou En-lai proposed to New Delhi the demilitarization of the Sino-Indian border on the MeMahon Line and in Ladakh to a depth of 20 kilometers from the then existing areas under control of either country. This would give China control of 6,000 square miles of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.[25] The Indians rejected this proposal, but, ironically, the provisions of this proposal were precisely what Peking exacted from the situation by humiliating India in the border war from October to November 1962.

In applying its policies to the non-Communist countries around its borders, Communist China has taken two distinct approaches. Towards those countries which seek political accommodation and do not join with the United States or Russia to frustrate its aims, China offers the "Bandung Spirit" and the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." This cooperation has achieved notable success in obtaining border settlements with China for Burma, Nepal, Afganistan, and Pakistan. Although the last is a member of SEATO, its membership has primarily been for the purpose of strengthening its position against India; and this policy evidently has been acceptable to China. The other approach has resulted in political warfare against those Asian countries which cooperate with Russia and the United States.[26] For the Indians this has meant enmity with the Chinese, two years of indeterminate border discussions, and invasions of her country. These two approaches as applied to China's borders have given Peking the option of deciding where to commit its forces and where to apply the techniques of infiltration and subversion.

China's alliances with other Communist nations are based on ideological agreement which does not allow for other than the peaceful solution of any territorial disputes. This principle has been observed between China and North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia. Although there apparently have been no border disagreements since 1949 between the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, in 1964 the issue was raised by Mao Tse-tung when he claimed that approximiately 500,000 square miles of China's land had been taken by Russian imperialism during the Ch'ing dynasty.[27] Thus, the Chinese Communists have been able to pursue their nationalistic aims within the constraints of the Communist ideology.

V — CONCLUSIONS

In assessing the behavior of the Chinese Communists since the establishment of the CCP in 1921, it seems reasonable to conclude that nationalism is their primary motivating force and that communism (or more precisely

Maoism — Communism modified to serve the unique needs of China) is the means by which they have decided to pursue their nationalistic ambitions. As for the form this struggle has taken, and will take in the future, Chinese history provides a model known as the "Middle Kingdom," which appears to be the basic blueprint for Chinese Communist hopes. Statements of Chinese Communist leaders and actions they have taken to date all point in this direction.

Although the leaders on Mainland China call themselves Communists, their words and actions reveal them to be, in effect, the latest in a long line of emperors and imperial officials who ruled the land for many centuries. They have fused the messianic appeal of communism with Chinese national pride and arrogance. They dream of making China once again the "Middle Kingdom," the center of the world, from which supreme power will be exercised over the "barbarians" near and far. Their ambition is sharpened by a determination to avenge the humiliation and exploitation their nation suffered during the past century and a half at the hands of both Westerners and Russians.

On the road to realizing their ambitions, the Chinese leaders first came under the tutelage of Stalin. Traditional Chinese political assumptions may have disposed Mao to acquiesce in Stalin's primacy between 1949 and 1953, even though, from personal experience, Mao was painfully aware of Stalin's ineptitude in assessing the Chinese scene. China (or, by extension, the Soviet bloc) is a political and cultural universe. It cannot be divided. In this universe there is only one Son of Heaven. He and his dynasty (or party) are the repository of final power. The Son of Heaven is also the repository and embodiment of ultimate truth (be it Confucian or Marxist), by virtue of which he rules. Mao's necessary acquiescence in Stalin's primacy after 1949, despite his own personal inclinations, may well have been supported by these intellectual dispositions. Historically, China had been under the sway or influence of "barbarians" more than once, but their sway was never permanent. Between 1949 and 1953 Mao could accept Stalin's primacy because Stalin's was an identifiable political role within the context of both Chinese tradition and Chinese communism, as is Mao's today.

The accession of new groups to power in China has usually resulted in a reaffirmation of the Chinese "political style," however modified by immediate circumstances. Mao can no more escape China, with its problems and traditions, than Stalin could have escaped Russia. With Stalin's death, the subsequent political instability in the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev's policy innovations, Mao felt that the mantle of orthodoxy and truth had passed to him. Thus, after 1956 he felt justified in striking out boldly for bloc leadership.

Mao is caught up in a three-way tension between traditional dispositions, the imperatives of modern nationalism, and the Marxist ideological necessity that China be part of the mainstream of world history which is governed by laws that are universal. For Mao, the only resolution of this tension lies in the conviction and insistence that his ideological formulations are orthodox and universally valid. (Ask any Red Guard.) In one dimension, he is fighting for his international political life, for his belief that he now rightly occupies the ideological (and power) position formerly held by Stalin. But in another dimension, Peking's fundamental acceptance of Brezhnev's and Kosygin's ideological leadership would

require, intellectually, much more than Mao's abandonment of his own ideological position. It would require the abandonment and denial of the most fundamental political principal in the Chinese tradition: the centrality of China and the unique power of China's ruler.

FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Dean G. Acheson, "Letter of Transmittal," U.S. Dept. of State, *United States Relations With China* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949), p. xvi.

I — NATIONALISM BEGETS COMMUNISM

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2. Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 8.
3. Payne, p. 61.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 62-63.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 62.
6. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 9.
7. *Supra*, p. 2-3.
8. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 11.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
10. Payne, p. 74.
11. For an account of the tribulations of the first meeting see Hsiao Yu, *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959), p. 196-203.
12. Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China: 1924-1927* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 3.
13. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 38.
14. Cheng Tien-fang, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957), p. 121.
15. Benjamin I. Schwartz, p. 41.
16. Brandt, p. 31.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 33-34.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
19. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1956), v. IV, p. 250.

II — MAO TSE-TUNG AND FOREIGN POLICY

1. As an indication that this feeling expressed by Mao is more Chinese than Communist, Chiang Kai-shek in his book, *China's Destiny*, took the Western Powers to task for their imperialism toward China in political and economic affairs just as Sun Yat-sen had done previously in his *Three Principles of the People.*
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3. George F. Kennan, "Stalin and China," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1961, p. 39.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

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8. *Ibid.*
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11. For an account of the almost unbelievable ordeal of the Long March as related to Edgar Snow by Mao Tse-tung see Edgar Snow, *Red Star over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 177-196.
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13. *Ibid.*
14. Rowe, p. 55.
15. Fairbank, p. 235.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 235-245.
17. See Dept. of State, *United States Relations with China.*
18. Mao, v. IV, p. 269.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 302-303.
20. Fairbank, p. 264-266.
21. U.S. Dept. of State, p. 132.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 605.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 170-171.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 710-719.
25. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1956), v. V, p. 415.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 417.

III — THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

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3. Stalin, quoted in Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1953), p. 331.
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5. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964), p. 146.
6. A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," American Assembly, *The United States and the Far East* (New York: 1956), p. 139-140.
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9. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*, p. 147.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 156-157.
11. Geoffrey F. Hudson, et al., eds., *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 42.
12. William E. Griffith, *World Communism Divided* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1964), p. 13.
13. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*, p. 157.
14. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc, Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 153.

15. John K. Fairbank, "The People's Middle Kingdom," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1966, p. 575.
16. Paul M. A. Linebarger, et al., *Far Eastern Governments and Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1957), p. 88.
17. Palmiro Togliatti, "9 Domande sullo Stalinismo," Columbia University, Russian Institute, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 215.
18. Hudson, et al., eds., p. 3.
19. Edward Crankshaw, "Khruschev and China," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1961, p. 47.
20. Hudson, et al., eds., p. 3.
21. Crankshaw, p. 44.
22. Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, p. 180-181.
23. Hudson, et al., eds., p. 3.
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26. Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, p. 66.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
28. Daniel N. Jacobs, *The New Communist Manifesto* (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 136.
29. Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, p. 68.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 72.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
33. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 364.
34. Donald S. Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1960, p. 3.
35. Harry Schwartz, *Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars*, p. 162.
36. Raymond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," *The Annals*, September 1963, p. 90.
37. Zagoria, *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, p. 209.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
39. Geoffrey F. Hudson, "A New Phase in Chinese Communism," *The New Leader*, 15 December 1958, p. 17.

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2. North, p. 260.
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5. George N. Patterson, *Peking versus Delhi* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 100.
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7. Prithivis C. Chakravarti, *India's China Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 29.
8. Patterson, p. 103.
9. Chin Szu-k'ai, "Foreign Relations," Yu lien yen chiu so, *Communist China, 1949-1959* (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1961), v. II, p. 100.
10. Geoffrey Wheeler, "Sinkiang and the Soviet Union," *The China Quarterly*, October-December 1963, p. 58.
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15. Chakravarti, p. 64.
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17. Leo E. Rose, "Conflict in the Himalayas," *Military Review*, February 1963, p. 5.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
19. Patterson, p. 161.
20. Mark Mancall, "What Red China Wants," *The New Republic*, 17 November 1962, p. 10.
21. Maharaj K. Chopra, "The Himalaya Border War: an Indian Military Review," *Military Review*, May 1963, p. 10.
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23. Girilal Jain, *Panchsheela and After: a Re-appraisal of Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the Tibetan Insurection* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 99.
24. Bernard B. Fall, "Red China's Aim in South Asia," *Current History*, September 1962, p. 139.
25. Jain, p. 180.
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27. Harry Schwartz, *China*, p. 134.

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To achieve victory we must as far as possible make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing his eyes and ears, and drive his commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds.

Mao Tse-tung, 1893-, On Protracted War



PROFESSIONAL READING

The evaluations of recent books listed in this section have been prepared for the use of resident students. Officers in the fleet and elsewhere may find these books of interest in their professional reading.

The inclusion of a book in this section does not necessarily constitute an endorsement by the Naval War College of the facts, opinions or concepts contained therein.

Many of these publications may be found in ship and station libraries. Certain of the books on the list which are not available from these sources may be available from one of the Navy's Auxiliary Library Service Collections. These collections of books are obtainable on loan. Requests from individual officers to borrow books from an Auxiliary Library Service Collection should be addressed to the nearest of the following special loan collections.

Chief of Naval Personnel (C-463)
Department of the Navy
Washington, D.C. 20370

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Guam)
Library (ALSC), Box 174
San Francisco, Calif. 96630

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station (Pearl Harbor)
Library (ALSC), Box 20
San Francisco, Calif. 96610

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC), Bldg. C-9
Norfolk, Virginia 23511

Commanding Officer
U.S. Naval Station
Library (ALSC)
San Diego, Calif. 92136

Bromke, Adam and Uren, Philip E., eds. *The Communist States and the West.* New York: Praeger, 1967. 242 p.

Thirteen authors are represented in this collection of papers and lectures edited by Adam Bromke and Philip E. Uren. The common theme throughout the book is as stated by the title; however, the subjects range from Canada's role in East-West relations, to Vietnam, to Soviet policy toward underdeveloped countries. In tracing the evolution from the postwar rigid polarization between Moscow and Washington, as the two superpowers with their respective allies, to the current polycentrism, some very arresting views are presented. This is in part attributable to the fact that with only four exceptions the authors of the articles are Canadians. These writers place the happenings between the East and West in a different light from that in which they are normally viewed by Americans. In consequence, the observations may be regarded perhaps as controversial, but surely as highly interesting. The book is recommended to both staff and students.

J. W. COTTON, JR.
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Cantril, Hadley. *The Human Dimension: Experiences in Policy Research.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967. 202 p.

Following the trends of public opinion, learning how public opinion is affected by events, evaluation of public opinion in terms of the future — in short, discovery of the state of mind of a nation and its policy implications — such is the human dimension described by Professor Cantril. He introduces the book with two examples of social research, those obtained in Cuba and the Dominican Republic; then he considers the theory behind such research and the tools used. The major portion of the book is spent in relating illustrations of different types of policy research accumulated during the period extending from World War II to the present day. In the last chapter the author discusses the use of policy research in U.S. Government operations.

> In spite of the millions of dollars spent by Government and private sources for social science researeh of one kind or another, there actually is still very little such research initiated or even utilized by those responsible for Government policies on either the domestic or foreign fronts. The whole concept of research concerned with the psychological and political dynamics of people simply has not yet been effectively geared into the United States Government operation.

The author builds his case by recounting successful examples of his policy research exploits over the years; however, failures are not mentioned. He has treated the mechanics of this type of human research rather lightly but has provided several graphic examples of the results of his work. Although the book is a little weak in some areas, Professor Cantril makes a good case for the use of what is often an overlooked ingredient in our governmental decisionmaking. The book makes interesting reading for the "layman."

R. M. HARP
Commander, U.S. Navy

Coats, Wendell J. *Armed Force as Power.* New York: Exposition Press, 1966. 432 p.

Armed Force as Power by Brig. Gen. Wendell J. Coats, U.S. Army, is a detailed analytical stndy whose purpose is to examine selected critical conceptual mechanisms that have been operative in the interrelation of military force and political power. It is the published manuscript of an original dissertation submitted by the author as

partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This work is dedicated to military professionalism, to the oft-repeated belief that military power is the ultimate extension of foreign policy, and to the thesis that decisive battle appears to be the only military solution that consistently fulfills the multiple requirements of strategy. The author notes that, from the perspective of peace, military strength is only one limited aspect of national strength, but from the perspective of war, military strength becomes a measure of national strength. He comments on the military advantage and quick decisiveness of a preventive war and provides a detailed analysis of the various types of military victories as an extension of national policies, noting that "victory" is the ambiguous political symbol for which men fight.

This work is filled with many valuable observations as to the role of the military. Acceptance of military professionalism has simplified the problem of integrating military considerations into national policy. In military operations the separation of policy and strategy is no longer possible, and tactical victory becomes the paramount objective when the vital interests of adversaries are vulnerable to direct attack. Interestingly, it is observed that there is no logic to conclude that an act of force will compel an adversary to do one's will; it may simply destroy him or eventually exhaust both antagonists. The concept and historical significance of a "just war" are traced from the writings of Machiavelli through to the Allied policy of "unconditional surrender" in the Second World War. In conclusion, it is noted that adequate military strength supported by the resolve to use it seems more conducive to national security than excessive emphasis upon highly superior force levels.

The writing style of the author is voluble and highly descriptive; however, the central points covered are frequently obscured through excessively erudite verbal gymnastics. The work is thoroughly annotated with footnotes and would be a valuable military professional reference volume were the style more direct.

J. G. TILLSON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Fairbank, John K. *China: the People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 145 p.

This book contains a series of essays by Mr. Fairbank which were published separately in various periodicals. These have been updated to fit the current situation. The book is divided into three parts: "China's Revolution in the Light of Her Past," "The Taiwan Problem," and "Communist China and American Policy." The first part carries the theme that to know China is to be thoroughly aware of her history and concludes with the thought that "Peking's intractable mood comes out of China's history, not just from Lenin's book." In part II the author indicates that the American-Chinese relations are haunted by the ambiguous status of Taiwan; yet this problem is carefully and continuously ignored, at least in public. He indicates that a step toward clarification would be an explicit definition of American motives and some creative effort. The United States also needs the assistance of Taiwan in the study of the grave problems with which she is faced in the Chinese quarter of the globe. The third and largest section of the book decries the fact that the United States has avoided the entire China problem for the last 10 years in the hope that it would go away.

While a soft approach is not emphasized, Mr. Fairbank does advocate

a new effort at nonmilitary contact with Peking. Such a policy could act as a catalyst rather than as an obstruction to the stabilization of Peking's relations with the rest of the world. Washington should shift from a policy of trying to isolate Peking, which seems only to worsen U.S. problems, to a position where Americans acquiesce in the growth of contact between Communist China and other countries and "let them suffer the impact of Peking's abrasiveness." Red China's membership in the United Nations is urged so that she could no longer pose as a martyr, excluded by American imperialism. Thus, she would have to deal with other member states on world issues and learn to act as a full member of the international community. This would lead to eventual maturity and acceptance of the restraints on her revolutionary ardor. In summary, U.S. policy should be a balance of containment and contact — informational, commercial, cultural, and diplomatic — which will probably take years to achieve but would nevertheless be well worth the effort.

J. G. FIFIELD
Captain, U.S. Navy

Goldman, Marshall I. *Soviet Foreign Aid.* New York: Praeger, 1967. 265 p.

The issue of foreign aid frequently draws considerable attention in discussions of foreign policy and Congressional budgetary debates. The tendency, alas, is to find most arguments about foreign aid expressed in terms of emotional allegiance or in the nomenclature of the balance sheet. It is refreshing to find a simplified and balanced review of the worldwide foreign aid picture presented by Mr. Marshall J. Goldman in *Soviet Foreign Aid.* As the title suggests, the analysis emphasizes the role played by the U.S.S.R. as a granter of aid since World War II. However, the author also presents an interesting view of the interplay between Soviet efforts and aid offered by the United States, China, and the Communist satellites. Although the reader may question the accuracy of the data presented, the sources appear to be creditable. Employing existing literature, firsthand inspections, and discussions with government officials around the world, Mr. Goldman has etched out a fairly complete and unbiased picture.

The major effort is directed toward the impact of Soviet economic relations in the developing countries. Through case studies of individual nations, specific projects are investigated to disclose successes and failures which have occurred in the implementation of various aid policies. Spectacular achievements such as the Aswan Dam and the Bhilai steel mill are contrasted with the frustration and lack of success in the area of luxury hotels, sports stadiums, and oversized factories, and in the inadequacies in military equipment.

In the field of foreign relations the author develops the influence of Soviet aid on the policies of Communist, non-Communist, neutral, and nonaligned nations. Of particular interest is the analysis of Russian aid to Communist China and North Vietnam.

In conclusion, the author answers four basic questions: What has been the purpose of Soviet economic relations with the less developed world? What has Russian aid accomplished? What has it not been able to do? and, What are the implied lessons that the United States can glean from the Soviet experience? The scope of the book is broad without being confusing, and the reliance on narrative description rather than graphic or numerical analysis

contributes to interesting and informative reading.

R. A. YOUNG
Commander, U.S. Navy

Kramarz, Joachim. *Stauffenberg*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 255 p.

This is the story of Claus Graf (Count von Stauffenberg) who, by most accounts, was the architect of the 20 July 1944 attempt on Hitler's life. Although there were many others actively engaged in the challenge to Hitler's entrenched dictatorship, Stauffenberg seems to have been the link between all sections of this particular plot. Someone once noted that a properly documented biographical study of Claus von Stauffenberg would provide a valuable contribution to history, and this is the author's attempt to fill this need. Mr. Kramarz was handicapped by the lack of Stauffenberg's personal papers, since they were confiscated by the Gestapo immediately after his ill-fated attempt on Hitler's life. Consequently, much of his research was devoted to conversations and interviews with persons who had intimate knowledge of the events leading to the placement of the bomb by Stauffenberg in the room where Hitler was being briefed by his staff. The author notes that after the failure of the bomb plot many worthy Germans cast the blame for the disaster on Stauffenberg. This book is his attempt to restore Stauffenberg to what Kramarz believes to be his rightful place in German history.

The conclusion is that Stauffenberg acted in response to obligations, love of his country, responsibility of his profession, and conscience born of his Christian convictions. This book has only limited value to the general reader. Although the author has done much to recreate Stauffenberg's life and his part in the attempted coup d'etat, the average American reader will probably feel that his time could have been put to better use. In fairness, it must be admitted that this book, no doubt, fills a need for German readers who are more closely linked to their own history.

W. K. CALLAM
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Lerche, Charles O. *Last Chance in Europe*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967. 221 p.

Last Chance in Europe is an attempt to analyze the underlying reasons for the decline in friendly relations between the Europeans and Americans. The author endeavors to bring the primary attention of American policymakers back to Europe. Periods of neglect of European orientation, such as the current Vietnamese war, result in separation between American and European unity. Mr. Lerche had extensive experience in European affairs and points out that the political scene in Europe, as viewed from Europe, is vastly different from that viewed from Washington. The image of Europe held by Americans is 20 years behind the times. He perceives Europe as a great area of economic expansion and capacity, with strong materialistic overtones, coming again in the political field. The Iron Curtain has eroded, and Europe is no longer divided. The author foresees that the only road for American policy is the establishment of a political partnership between the United States and Europe. This replaces the present concept of American leadership in Europe. This partnership would revamp or replace NATO with a much more limited organization having independent foreign policies for its members.

This book is not recommended as required reading. However, it is interesting to find a proposed solution to the current European problems.

W. W. BIGLER
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Lockwood, Charles A. and Adamson, Hans C. *Battles of the Philippine Sea.* New York: Crowell, 1967. 229 p.

Admiral Lockwood, World War II Commander of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force, collaborating with retired Air Force Colonel Hans C. Adamson, has produced an absorbing account of some of the most brilliant days of American seapower. Beginning with the Mariannas invasion — breaching the "absolute national defense line" set by the Japanese to run from Kamchatka through the Mariannas, Truk, western New Guinea, around Indonesia, and on up to Singapore — and concluding with the invasion of Leyte, the book covers an action-packed 5-month period from June through October 1944 which saw U.S. carrier, amphibious, and submarine forces reduce the Japanese Navy to impotency and seal the fate of Japan. The authors have done an excellent job of highlighting the more important details of the many battles that took place. The writing is almost breezy, but the perspective and grasp of events is thoroughly professional. Comparing this relatively compact book with Professor Morison's extensive two-volume coverage of the same events in his *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, one concludes that this new book is a worthwhile effort, eminently readable, and soundly conceived.

G. H. WINSLOW
Commander, U.S. Navy

Masters, Roger D. *The Nation Is Burdened.* New York: Knopf, 1967. 319 p.

Mr. Masters proposes that the United States can no longer afford the luxury of *ad hoc* decisions to meet crises in international politics as they arise. He calls for a set of long-term objectives that the United States should develop for herself as a major power. His solution will appeal to many, especially those who harbor even a latent streak of isolationism. What is proposed is a return to the interactions of a pluralistic world organized in the manner of the traditional balance of power between existing or foreseeable superpowers, each with its own sphere of influence. The author does not feel that this requires abandonment of the American ideals which imply that we seek to foster democracy, peace, or international cooperation. Rather, he feels that this "Machiavellian manipulation of power" is the only feasible approach to the problem of a world threatened by the specter of nuclear holocaust,

> since the pursuit of an international balance of power without regard to ideology or domestic institutions of other nations is both tolerable and normally defensible because it serves to strengthen American democracy. Insofar as we are convinced that our political order is worthy of imitation, our foreign policies can and should frankly emphasize our national interests . . ..

Mr. Masters, of course, suffers from the occupational hazard of all "crystal-ball gazers." His avowed panacea to the world's ills may not indeed be a viable one. His premise is well argued, however, and deserves the attention of the casual as well as the serious student of U.S. foreign policy. His style will appeal to the orderly mind, and one trained to think in the manner of consideration of alternatives will find his logic plausible. Indeed, he is a master of the technique of considering alternatives and convincingly disproving and thus discarding those which fail to support his premise.

H. E. LANG
Commander, U.S. Navy

Naval War College Review, Vol. 21 [1968], No. 1, Art. 1

McClintock, Robert. *The Meaning of Limited War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 239 p.

Here is presented a series of case studies in limited war, several of which are based upon the personal experiences of the author. The book was written while Ambassador McClintock was assigned as the State Department Adviser to the President of the U.S. Naval War College. The stated purpose of the book "is to study the nature of past, present, and probable war in the last half of the twentieth century," and in the words of the author "is . . . written by a professional diplomat for the elucidation of the citizen who is concerned."

The author's analysis of the past and present limited wars, i.e., wars where there is no direct confrontation between nuclear powers, indicates that each has the common properties of: (1) the use of surrogate forces, (2) the respect of sanctuaries, (3) the inclusion of the new Communist political invention of "wars of national liberation," and (4) the use of international organizations for either debate and/or settlement. It is these factors which place the wars of today in the political rather than the military arena, and, at least to the author, it is not so much whether we win or not, but, rather, are we still there when the game is over? The nuclear stalemate has made general war "a terminal folly," and if the free world, primarily through the use of seapower, can make national wars of liberation unproductive, eventually differences between nations and ideologies can be settled only at the conference table. For as the author states, "It is the thousand year view that the statesman must assume, and in this perspective the diplomat may take hope from history." Perhaps.

The Meaning of Limited War is easy and interesting reading, and although the military officer may take exception to, and, in some cases, umbrage at, specific portions or vignettes, the book does provide insight into the meaning of "limited war" from a diplomatic point of view.

A. J. ASHURST
Commander, U.S. Navy

Mtshali, B. Vulindlela. *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967. 255 p.

The author of this book is a South African Zulu who is currently working on a Ph.D. degree in political science at New York University. His discussion of the problem of Rhodesia is obviously from the viewpoint of the Black African, and Mr. Mtshali makes no claim for impartiality. His book is, however, straightforward and well documented. It seeks to examine the background of colonial development in Rhodesia and to trace the events which led to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. In his analysis of the Rhodesian controversy the author is highly critical, not only of Britain, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity for their inability or failure to take effective action against the regime of Ian Smith, but also of the disunity within the African nationalist movement in Rhodesia itself. The volume points out that the political energies of the Africans have been seriously dissipated by the utter failure of the black nationalist organizations to act in unison against the white-dominated Rhodesian Government. The author acknowledges that power is now securely in the hands of the white settlers and that Rhodesian independence is a fait accompli which will be extremely difficult to reverse. His conclusion, however, that the crisis in Rhodesia has done irreparable damage to relations between black and white throughout Africa is hard to contest.

This book is well written, easy to read, and is recommended as worthwhile background material for anyone with a particular interest in African affairs.

J. E. ARNOLD
Commander, U.S. Navy

Oglesby, Carl and Shaull, Richard. *Containment and Change*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. 248 p.

The book comprises two essays discussing revolution in today's world as viewed by authors who were not known to each other before February 1966. One (Oglesby) had previously been involved in the American domestic movement toward a more just society; the other (Shaull) spent many years in Latin America in close association with Catholic and Protestant student movements. These backgrounds provide a clue to the theme and setting of the essays.

Of the two, Oglesby's "Vietnamese Crucible" is the more radical. The basic premise is a quest for social change through disassociation with total world involvement and through a defeated and outmoded containment. Consider the following events as espoused by Oglesby: In World War II the United States forced Stalin into an accommodation with Hitler; she failed to provide a quick second front in France and thereby caused mass suffering in Russia and justified Stalin's postwar foreign policy in Europe; Washington obstructed Russia's economic rehabilitation by denying her the richest parts of Europe as reparations; Stalin was not a revolutionary but a nationalist, and because of Americans' shabby treatment, he was forced to create a system of buffer satellite states as a sentinel against a resurgent Germany. Consider further a lengthy argument which purports to show that the widening economic gap between the "haves" and "have nots" is principally caused, not by communism, but by American corporations, collectively characterized as the "United Fruit Company"; and that this is at the core of third world revolutions; further, that the solution to these ills will be found in states not hampered by private investment, nor harassed nor manipulated by corporate interests of outside states. Big business is made the culprit, and a variety of examples ultimately focusing on Vietnam are used to prove the case against an economic imperialism.

The essay by Shaull entitled "Revolution: Heritage and Contemporary Option" is much the milder in tone and outlook. He places change in historical perspective by relating and identifying with "messianism," and defining the role that Judeo-Christian example has played in our Western self-understanding. He sets forth a blueprint for revolution, preferably without violence, which espouses its causes in a series of coordinated dissents by small, radical groups (the political equivalent of guerrilla warfare) in order to achieve a humanistic world of social equality for all mankind.

There is a need to know what apostles of dissent today are thinking and advocating. This book's redeeming virtue is that it partially serves that purpose.

D. J. MORGIEWICZ
Commander, U.S. Navy

Palit, D. K. *War in the Deterrent Age*. London: Macdonald, 1966. 244 p.

Military strategy and policymaking have undergone such fundamental changes in concept during the past 20 years that it requires conscious and determined study to keep pace with the sophisticated arguments and theories of nuclear dialectics. Unless this effort is made, not only by professionals but also by thinking people everywhere, obsolete notions based on traditional

usage are likely to continue to prevail in many significant and crucial quarters and thus misguide the actions and decisions of individuals and governments alike. With these statements, Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit, Indian Army, launches into the subject of war in the deterrent age. The author suggests that the establishment of a balance of deterrents in nuclear strategy does not necessarily create a historical condition in which other forms of war become outlawed. On the contrary, he states that we have now entered a new era in history in which strategic planning entails being prepared at all times to wage war at all levels — ranging from the "absurd" war of swift all-out nuclear exchange to Mao Tse-tung's creeping guerrilla aggression that might involve years of actual but "unconventional" combat. Unfortunately, the very immensity of the requirement creates a reluctance toward its acceptance. It becomes easier to believe that the absolute deterrent is absolute strategy: that the choice in the future could lie only between mutual destruction and peace and that, therefore, the threat of the one is the guarantee of the other.

In this book General Palit directs his thoughts to those who would interest themselves in contemporary defense thinking — professionals and laymen alike. He presents the essence of the arguments and counterarguments in the nuclear debate in concise and relatively uncomplicated form. At the same time he presents a brief history of the development of the traditional concepts of military strategy in conventional, unconventional, and nuclear war. This book may be most useful as a summary of much of the contemporary thought on this most complex subject.

J. A. BACON
Commander, U.S. Navy

Salisbury, Harrison E. *Orbit of China.* New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 204 p.

> Now there was another war and nothing was simple about it . . .. There was no agreement, no easy, recognizable consensus Good, only terrible portents of Evil . . .. Over the whole world there was alarm and fear lest the contagion spread, lest the engines of destruction . . . might be unloosed in ever-widening circles, fanning out from Asia and beyond. . . . It was this which had set me off on a mission to the most distant ends of the earth . . . seeking the sources of the torment and the tragedy . . .. Was it really China that lay behind it all? Or was it, as not a few Americans believed, the United States, blundering and bludgeoning, blindly striking out in a kind of frenzy of frustration? Had China and ourselves embarked on a collision course which could lead only to world nuclear destruction?

And so, in 1966, Harrison E. Salisbury of *The New York Times*, intentionally bypassing the Vietnams, went into a 30,000-mile clockwise orbit of China, stopping off in Hong Kong, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Burma, India, Sikkim, Moscow, Mongolia, several Siberian cities, and Japan. In each he established contact with what the reviewer can classify only as observers, because with but a few exceptions — Gen. Ne Win of Burma being one of the most notable — they are referred to only as the official, the sergeant, banker, physician, China-watcher, diplomat, the pilot, American officer, mayor, et cetera. Of particular interest is the insight offered in the chapter on Burma which for more than 3 years has been sealed to foreigners; diplomatic missions have been reduced, most foreign aid has been discontinued, newspapermen are banned, tourist trade has halted, and foreign businessmen are denied entry. Salisbury's visit was a rare exception.

The author senses a clear and present danger that China and the United States are far advanced along a course which can lead only to nuclear war and that the Chinese, unlike most Americans, have already fully perceived this. His solutions lie in the creation of a framework of relationships which would enable China to live in peace with America and vice versa. The key to the China problem is seen as food and population. Mr. Salisbury advances proposals toward solution of these problems and that of breaking down the barrier of Chinese isolation. The book is interesting, easily readable, and probably an authentic statement of the views of those consulted.

A. J. PICKERT
Commander, U.S. Navy

Spanier, John W. *World Politics in an Age of Revolution.* New York: Praeger, 1967. 434 p.

In this book the author attempts to provide the reader with an understanding of the forces that shape the present world. He has limited his analysis to three forces — the revolution in military technology, the nationalist and social revolution throughout the underdeveloped areas, and the "permanent revolution" of communism. The author believes that each of these three revolutions or forces has profoundly transformed the nature of international politics since World War II. Mr. Spanier is not content with the usual explanations of the behavior of states that conclude there are certain enduring trends such as the "seeking of power" and the pursuing of "national interest." He delves further, elucidating the specific motives that compel states to behave in certain ways. His contention is that a state's environment determines its behavior, and an examination of any state's environment must be made to determine why a state has acted in a certain manner.

One of his principal arguments is that the very nature of the international system will affect, to a large degree, the behavior of states unless a careful study is made of the prevailing conditions at that time. He cautions the reader not to ignore the relationship between domestic and internal factors and foreign policy decisions and that any study of international politics must be a "two-level" analysis of both international and domestic considerations. His chapters on communism (ch. III and IX) vividly make this point for his reader.

This book is not easy to read but contains much useful information for the student of international relations. Mr. Spanier has overcome one serious defect that most authors overlook; that is, he presents each topic separately with its own conclusions so that his reader may pursue his quest for knowledge at his own speed. His conclusion that we must learn to live "with" many of our problems rather than hope to "solve" them is worthy of serious contemplation.

W. K. CALLAM
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

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	Comdr. W. E. Wilder, USN
	Lt. Comdr. E. J. Sottak, USN
	Comdr. C. D. Bush, USN
Head, Engineering and Maintenance Division	*Comdr. E. G. Pezzei, USN*
Head, Maintenance Branch	*Lt. E. L. Dammann, USN*

Correspondence School	
Director	*Col. T. C. Dutton, USMC*
Head, International Affairs Division	*Comdr. R. M. Laske, USN*
Assistants	*Lt. Comdr. F. J. Flynn, USN*
	Comdr./Lt. Comdr. D. E. Oleson, USN
	Comdr. W. J. Quirk, USN
	Comdr. R. L. Gennette, USN
Head, Strategy and Tactics Division	
Assistants	*Comdr. W. F. Goodman, USN*
	Comdr. J. E. Woolway, USN
	Lt. Comdr. W. A. Bacchus, USN
	Lt. Comdr. H. L. Lane, SC, USN
Head, International Law Division	*Comdr. H. S. Palau, USN*
Assistant	*Comdr. R. J. Rogers, USN*

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Congratulations are extended to Comdr. John T. Rigsbee, U.S. Navy, and Comdr. Joseph A. Fitzpatrick, U.S. Navy, recent graduates of the Naval War College Correspondence Course of Naval Command and Staff.

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